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ABSTRACT 
 
BECOMING A REGIONAL POWER: A COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND 
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICIES (2002-2015) 
 
Erdoğdu, Osman. 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Vugar Imanbeyli 
June 2016, 125 pages 
 
This thesis presents a comparative study of Turkish and Japanese foreign policy 
activities since 2002. By comparing their foreign policies over their activities to 
become a regional power, this thesis aims to look upon the efficiency of those policies 
in achieving respective country’s aims. Due to the similarities between Turkey and 
Japan in terms of aiming to become a regional power, Japan’s foreign policy is taken 
as a reference for comparison. The interest and study of Turkish foreign policy has 
risen in the past few years due to Turkey’s increasing activism in political field, 
enhanced influence in its region, most prominently its increasing soft power. This 
thesis aims to make a more inclusive study by looking into use of both hard and soft 
power and events that are surrounding the country. 
We focus on Turkish and Japanese foreign policies through their democracy 
promotion, the use of the financial aid in their foreign policy and their security 
problems. Also the effects of the hard and soft power on those policies and those 
policies’ effects on countries’ hard and soft power is taken into account. Rather than 
evaluating the success of those policies, this thesis aimed at elaborating whether those 
policies yielded the desired results. Using this approach this thesis pointed out some 
of the reasons of the inefficiency in some policies, and to better evaluated the 
efficiency of their policies towards in their regional power bid. 
 
Keywords: Turkey, Japan, Turkish Foreign Policy, Japanese Foreign Policy, Regional 
Power. 
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ÖZ 
 
BÖLGESEL GÜÇ OLMA: 2002-2015 ARASINDAKİ TÜRK VE JAPON DIŞ 
POLİTİKALARINA DAİR BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA 
 
Erdoğdu, Osman 
MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yard. Doç. Dr. Vügar İmanbeyli 
Haziran 2016, 125 Sayfa 
 
Bu tez Türk ve Japon Dış Politikaları’nın 2002 yılından bu yana bölgesel güç olma 
adına gerçekleştirdikleri aktiviteler üzerine bir araştırmadır. Türk ve Japon dış 
politikalarının bölgesel güç olma yolunda yaptıkları uygulamalar üzerinden 
karşılaştırarak dış politikalarının bu amaçları doğrultusunda ne kadar efektif olduğunu 
incelemiştir. Bu çalışmada Japon Dış Politikası Türk Dış Politikasına olan benzerliği 
sebebiyle karşılaştırılma yapılabilecek nokta olarak seçilmiştir. Bu çalışmada iki 
ülkeyi çevreleyen olayların geneline bakılıp yumuşak ve sert gücü bir arada ele alarak 
bütüncül bir karşılaştırılma ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır.  
Hem Türkiye hem de Japonya bölgesel güç olmayı amaçlamakta ve benzer siyasal ve 
jeopolitik durumları sebebiyle birbirine benzer politikalar izlemektedirler. Bu iki 
ülkenin dış politikaları demokrasi teşvikinin kullanımı, ekonomik yardımının dış 
politikalarındaki rolü ve güvenlik sorunları üzerinden ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca bu 
politikaların ülkelerin hem yumuşak hem de sert güçlerini nasıl şekillendirdikleri ve 
onlar tarafından nasıl şekillendirildikleri de irdelenmiştir. Bu tezde bu politikaların 
başarılı olup olmadıklarından ziyade, istenilen sonuçları verip vermediği 
incelenmiştir. Bu yaklaşım sayesinde dış politikalarında izledikleri yöntemlerin bir 
kısmının neden etkisiz kaldığının sebepleri irdelenmiş, ve bölgesel güç olma yolundaki 
durumları daha iyi değerlendirilmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Japonya, Türk Dış Politikası, Japon Dış Politikası, 
Bölgesel Güç.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey and its potential for becoming a middle power or potentially a regional 
power has been discussed and analyzed in Turkey over the last few decades. Especially 
since the 2000s and with the Justice and Development Party (JDP) governments, 
Turkish foreign policy may seem to be focused on becoming a regional power. 
However, there has been little research to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy with 
respect to the expected goals or in comparison with the similar policies of the regional 
rivals. One could fill this gap by comparing Turkish Foreign Policy to the foreign 
policy of a country with a similar agenda to seek informative and valuable insight into 
its effectiveness. Thus, I aim to compare Turkish and Japanese foreign policies 
between 2002 and 2015 with regards to becoming a regional power and evaluate their 
effectiveness. Also by examining how different applications of similar activities by 
Turkey and Japan created different results I aim to bring a better understanding to the 
use of those activities in fostering foreign policy. 
 The regional power is a complex term to define. The definition of the regional 
power changes depending on how one perceives “region” and “power”. While more 
realist definitions may emphasis more on the military prowess of the country, others 
may attribute more to importance on the soft power influence. Thus, the manifold 
definitions have impact on the necessary conditions of becoming a regional power. In 
my thesis, I will use two sets of conditions I find most appropriate and generally 
applicable to every regional power, which are Stefan Schrim’s1 and Maxi Soheman’s2 
conditions. These conditions are power capacity, desire, activity, and acceptance by 
the regional countries. These attributes will serve as the basis of my analysis of Turkish 
and Japanese foreign policies.  
Since Turkey is a country that is trying to become a regional power, it needs to 
have a multi-layered foreign policy to satisfy all its objects. Turkish foreign policy 
cannot be explained by simply looking through one perspective of the political science, 
                                                          
 
1 Stefan Schirm, “Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik 
Brasiliens”. Lateinamerika Analysen 11 (2005): 107-30. 
2 Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003” in State of the Nation: 
South Africa 2003-2004, eds. by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, 2003.), p. 349-67. 
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and neither can it be compared with countries that are not in the same situation. Certain 
aspects of Turkish foreign policy cannot be fully understood if we look only through 
the prism of soft power. For example if we do not take Turkey’s resource dependency 
into account, we cannot explain Turkey’s cooperative attitude towards Iran and Russia. 
Thus, Turkish foreign policy will appear to be contradictive if only analyzed through 
soft power. Therefore, I aim to analyze Turkish foreign policy by taking into account 
the use of both hard power and soft power tools and the desired aims. This way, a more 
comprehensive perspective can be established. Secondly, I will look at Turkish foreign 
policy in process of become a regional power, because the JDP government seems to 
pursue this agenda since 2002. This policy is an amalgam of hard and soft powers 
aiming at particular goals in the region. Its effectiveness or progress must be 
understood in comparison to another state that also pursues the goal of becoming a 
regional power, with a relatively similar situation. If such a comparison is drawn 
between Turkey and the USA, the UK or any other country of a stronger stature, the 
outcome may not be able to predict the efficiency of this policy. Thus, because of 
similarities in its agenda and situation, Japan is chosen for the comparison.  
This comparison and subsequent analysis will be based on a study of Turkish 
and Japanese foreign policies since 2002, in terms of their desire to become regional 
powers. It can be argued that a comparison with a regional rival for the regional power 
bid would be more appropriate, but when we look at Turkey’s rivals in the region – 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, it can be seen that Turkey has a completely different political 
system and socio-cultural conditions. Turkey does not possess the resource capital of 
Saudi Arabia or the religious influence of Iran, but Turkey shares many similarities 
with Japan including in its political system and security problems – something that I 
will further explain in later chapters. The reason that I take 2002 as the starting point 
is because it is a milestone in both Turkish and Japanese politics. The year 2002 
witnessed the JDP’s and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ascension to power in Turkey, which 
marked the rise of a proactive foreign policy. In the same time period, there was the 
rise of Junichiro Koizumi in Japan, which marked a change in the Liberal Party of 
Japan LDP) and Japanese foreign policy from reactive to proactive and has been 
continued with his successor Shinzo Abe. Lastly, the year 2002 was of utmost 
significance on the global level due to the escalation of the US War on Terror and the 
consolidation of Putin’s power in Russia and multiple other incidents of similar nature. 
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While doing this comparison I will refer to some changes in the domestic 
politics in Japan and Turkey and their effects on the foreign policy, but I will not look 
to the domestic politics in so much detail. Due to the differences in the domestic 
politics and their handling by the respective governments, and the differences in the 
understanding and the relationship between the domestic politics and the foreign 
policy, I find it hard to compare the effects of the domestic politics on the foreign 
policy. Furthermore domestic politics and its effects on the foreign policy is not 
something that can be mentioned without giving an extended and informative 
background, which is on itself a chapter or another thesis topic. Also in some cases not 
only the analyzed country, but target country’s domestic politics may also prove 
important in particular policies and this will further complicate the already complex 
foreign policies. Therefore, I intend to not to delve in to the domestic politics too much. 
I will make my comparison around three activities that constitute an important 
part of both countries’ foreign policy activities. First, I will look to the use of financial 
aid by both Tokyo and Ankara. While developmental and humanitarian aids are often 
regarded as soft power-building tools, I tried to look at their hard power aspects as 
well, such as economic potential and security concerns. Both Turkey and Japan are 
using the financial aid for both soft power and hard power aims. Second, I will take 
the use of democracy promotion and economic progress as both a soft power and hard 
power building tool. And finally, I will look at the security dilemmas of both countries 
against rivals that are far superior to them. As the military capability is one of the main 
vessels in the international politics, excluding it will make it harder to explain certain 
situations. I took these three activities, financial aid, democracy promotion and 
military capability, because aid and democracy promotion are helpful to both Turkey 
and Japan’s soft and hard power and therefore it is important for them, and the 
importance of military capability is instrumental to understand any country’s policies. 
Because I intend to analyze and compare Turkish foreign policy to that of 
Japanese through the lenses of these three aspects, I have divided my thesis according 
to them. It will start by providing a description of what power is, why it is important 
in international relations, and the degrees of power as well as why and how the 
relations between these different degrees exist, so on and so forth. Then, it will 
describe hard and soft power, and why they are important in understanding the policies 
of the states. 
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The second chapter will look into the use of the developmental aid as a foreign 
policy tool. In the general approach the use of developmental aid is perceived as a tool 
to increase the donor’s soft power on the donee and to increase further cooperation. I 
tried to take it as a tool to achieve such aims, plus a supplementary tool for other 
policies. In Turkey’s case it is used as a tool to support its ambition to take on a 
leadership role by answering the needs of regional countries, such as Gaza and 
Somalia, and as a support to its claim as a role model to regional countries, such as 
Tunisia. In Japan’s case it is a tool to answer the needs of regional countries, therefore 
containing and countering Chinese influence, on countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, 
and to increase cooperation with possible military allies, such as India. 
In the third chapter, I took Ankara and Tokyo’s use of democracy promotion 
and economic progress discourse as a foreign policy tool. Turkey has used democracy 
promotion to increase its soft power and to show itself as a role model, as in the 
Tunisian and Egyptian cases. Japan on the other hand, uses democracy promotion and 
economic progress as a way to acquire hard power aims. Japan’s and a number of other 
regional countries’ security are under threat from China, a highly authoritarian regime 
that is accused with human rights violation and lack of democracy. To pull other 
countries into a security cooperation Japan has used its democracy and economy as a 
way to unite regional countries against Chinese encroachment. 
In the fourth chapter, I look at the security dilemmas and hard power realities 
of Turkey and Japan. While Japan and Turkey may try to pursue a proactive foreign 
policy, their policies are bound to the realities that are surrounding them. Turkey 
cannot act completely independent without first acquiring self-sufficiency in its 
military equipment modernization and acquisition, and secondly without taking other 
regional powers into account. Despite all its efforts, Turkey has been unable to 
convince the UN to make a move in Syria or to solve the problem on its own due to 
myriads of parties involved in the conflict. Japan’s situation regarding security is more 
precarious. While Turkey needs to increase its military self-sufficiency, Japan has 
problems regarding its army. The restrictions on the Japanese army were a problem 
that has shadowed Japanese foreign policy for decades, which was only changed on 
September 2015. Secondly, while the security threats to Turkey are potential threats, 
the security threats that Japan is facing are very real. Japan had to endure continued 
threats from North Korea and claims on its lands from China. Lately, China has moved 
more boldly with its disregard towards international law and started to endanger 
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regional security and balance more directly, which Japan has yet to counterbalance if 
it wants to become a regional power. 
In the concluding chapter, first I will give a general comparative overview of 
Turkish and Japanese foreign policies. I will look into whether their policies were able 
to give the intended effects or not. Then, I will evaluate the efficiency and results of 
the policies and whether they met the four conditions stated by Stefan Schrim and 
Maxi Schoeman. Although Turkey and Japan fulfilled and/or made progress in the first 
three conditions, they have been unable to acquire the last conditions, acceptance by 
the regional countries. I argue that because they could not get recognition as regional 
powers, they were unable to achieve their aim to become a regional power. 
Furthermore, their mistakes in their foreign policy activities was a big reason for that. 
Turkey’s insistence on its stance against Sisi and Bashar Assad made Ankara just 
another external power, which then created resentment and was one of the main 
reasons for regional antipathy for Turkey’s leadership claim. Different than Turkey, 
Japan was unable to commit itself fully in its activities and did not take a strict position 
like Turkey, which than made Tokyo look weak and it was not seen as an alternative 
to back against China. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
1.1. Regional Powers and International Power Structure 
From Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli, from Hobbes to Morgenthau, power 
has been an important part of political thought and international relations theories. Its 
acquisition and sustainment have been the main aim of international relations from 
Sumerian city-states to modern states. But what is power? Power is often described as 
the ability to acquire the intended results from others with or without their consent. 
One of the simplest definition of power is Professor Joseph Nye’s definition that 
describes power as “the ability to influence the behaviors of others to get the desired 
outcome”3. 
Power has its own types such as, hard power, soft power and smart power. In 
this thesis two types of power are referred, hard power and soft power and their 
combination which makes up the smart power but since this thesis is not about them, 
I will not further indulge in the concept of smart power. Hard power is the first type of 
power explained and theorized in international relations and political science. It is the 
purest form of power conceptualized in an anarchic world order where states only 
accept the crude reality, where the only way to survive is to acquire more and more 
economic and military power.4 Hard power is the power that Machiavelli proposes; it 
is the power one uses to make sure he is feared in case he is not loved.5 Soft power on 
the other hand is something completely different. A state can exert influence on others 
by using brute force and violence, but to influence others without using force is 
something different. Soft power is the ability to influence others’ actions without the 
need for force. Therefore, it is more complex to define and measure than hard power. 
While hard power can be measured by territory, resources, population and military 
force; measuring soft power is not that easy. 
                                                          
 
3 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
4 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and 
Approaches, 5th Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
5 Nicollo Machievalli, Hükümdar: Il Principe, (İstanbul: Say Yaınları, 1998) 
   7 
 
From power comes the classification of states according to their powers. States 
may be categorized like a pyramid in the international order. From bottom to the top 
states can be classified into small powers, middle powers, great powers, and 
hegemonic power. Each state in this pyramid tries to reposition itself into a higher 
category. While small powers try to become middle powers, the middle powers try to 
become great powers and great powers try to become the hegemonic power. And like 
a real pyramid, the stability of each floor is essential for the world order. When there 
were too many great powers that tried to become the hegemonic power the world saw 
intercontinental wars that devastated entire nations in a short period, as can be seen in 
the examples of the First and the Second World Wars. The hegemonic power is one of 
the most difficult parts of the pyramid to define. In simple words, it is the power that 
is hegemonic throughout the world. Previously, Great Britain was the hegemonic 
power for a brief period of time in the 19th century, and currently the USA is accepted 
as the hegemonic power. The USA’s place is currently challenged by Russia, China, 
and another bunch of middle powers. Also, more importantly, even though the USA is 
the hegemonic power, sometimes it still cannot acquire its desired outcomes from 
others, despite the sheer amount of its hard and soft power. Turkey’s refusal to grant 
military access during the US’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example of this. 
Regional powers are also a part of this pyramid, but their place is not clear. A 
state can be a regional power while it is merely a middle power, or it can be a regional 
power when it is above the middle power. Regional powers have always been a part 
of the international system. While the great powers define the system of the world, the 
regional powers define the system of their region. Regional powers may even defy the 
great powers in their region, such as the Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, which 
proved a crucial point in the Soviet Union’s defeat. Regional powers are important 
because they provide the link between the hegemonic powers and other countries and 
provide the necessary stabilizing factor to their region. If there is no regional power in 
a region, countries in that region will try to become the regional power and in the long 
run this will start an arms race, economic collapse and possible conflicts. One of the 
best examples for this was the Cold War period in the Middle East where Iraq, Iran, 
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Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia all simultaneously tried to increase their own influence, 
which created enmities and a war6 in the region. 
What is a regional power? Martin Wight defines regional power as a power 
between the middle powers and great powers, with a more geographically restricted 
and concentrated role. “States with general interest relative to a limited region and the 
capacity to act alone in this region, which gives them the appearance of local great 
powers.”7 We might summarize the definition by saying that a regional power is a 
country that can exert a certain amount of hegemonic influence in its own region but 
may lack this influence on global scale. This power can vary from hard power to soft 
power, but the country must be able to exert its influence in the region and manipulate 
regional politics for its own gains. Stefan Schirm8 and Maxi Schoeman9 propose 
similar conditions to define regional power. Schoeman lists; power capacity, desire, 
and acceptance. Schirm adds activity to those three. There are other conditions listed 
by various academics and institutes, but some of the definitions are stuck between 
regional power and middle power, usually combining them. However, the distinction 
between the two is important: while a regional power is influential in its own region, 
a middle power can be a country, which is active in international politics, and may or 
may not be a leading country in its region. 
Resources, claim, acceptance and appliance can be accepted as one of the 
simplest set of conditions for the definition of regional power. To be a regional power 
a country has to claim to be a regional power, for without the claim, the power is 
nothing. Secondly, the country has to have the resources to follow its claim. Any 
country can claim to be a regional power, as can be seen from the Balkans and the 
Middle East, but without resources there is little left to follow this claim. Thirdly, the 
country needs to direct its resources to apply its claim in its foreign policy. Lastly, it 
needs to be accepted by other countries in the region as a leader. Without this 
                                                          
 
6 The Iraqi-Iranian War may be read as the result of both countries aim of becoming a regional power. 
Iraq wanted to show its power to other Arab countries thus taking the mantle of leadership, and Iran 
wanted to promote and export its revolution to other Shia and pro-Shia minorities in the region to 
increase its influence. 
7 Martin, Wight, and Bull, Hedley et al. (eds.). Power Politics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 202). 
8 Stefan Schirm, “Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik 
Brasiliens”. Lateinamerika Analysen 11 (2005): 107-30. 
9 Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003” in State of the Nation: 
South Africa 2003-2004, eds. by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC 
Press, 2003.), p. 349-67. 
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acceptance its influence will be very limited. When we look at some of the current 
regional powers we can see that they have those conditions and also other similarities: 
 Most regional powers are historically either ex-great powers or middle powers. 
Examples include the UK, Germany, China, and Russia. They have a history of being 
an influential power and either still possesses a part of it, as the UK, or the desire to 
return to that power, as Germany and Russia. 
 They have economic potential. This potential can vary among countries. They 
can be developed economies like Germany, resource exporters like Russia, or 
developing economies like Brazil. Whatever the form they take, they have the 
economic potential to carry out their claims. 
 Depending on their situation and location, regional powers may possess an 
extensive military. For example, Russia has a very powerful military and constantly 
improves it. China and India are raising their military capacities. But others such as 
Germany and Brazil do not have powerful armies because of their location. 
 Demographically, many regional powers have growing populations. Brazil, 
India, and South Africa have growing populations and not only in quantity but also 
their quality is increasing. Some regional powers may have demographic problems, as 
Germany, but in their cases, this problem is solved by the immigrants attracted from 
other countries. 
Some countries may fulfil most of the Schoeman and Schirm’s conditions but 
still may not be a regional power. For example, Canada is among the most developed 
countries in the world with a powerful economy and a developing military, but it is not 
a regional power, because it has no claim to be a regional power, and is unable to exert 
any influence in its region. Thus, while Canada is a middle power, it is not a regional 
power because power by itself is not enough to become a regional power. To become 
a regional power, a country needs to exert influence on others, and be recognized as a 
regional power by others. Regional powers can vary from region to region and have 
different ways to exert influence. Russia with its military and economic power is the 
biggest power in the ex-Soviet bloc and is the head of the economic and security 
organizations in its area. China is able to exercise its influence via its massive 
   10 
 
economic power, by funding of projects in Third World countries.10 India is trying to 
improve its status in the international politics and gain a permanent seat in the UN. 
Throughout history, when great powers clashed, it happened through continental 
scale wars and peace agreements that defined and shaped the new structure. The 
Evangelical League and the Catholic League’s conflict led to the Thirty Years’ War 
and the subsequent Peace of Westphalia. Napoleonic France’s challenge to Great 
Britain led to the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna Congress. Nazi Germany and 
Japan’s claim to power lead to the Second World War and the subsequent Yalta 
Conference and the Treaty of San Francisco. These agreements set the rules of the new 
international order, either as the Vienna which brought a relative stability or as the 
Versailles which caused more strife and new wars.  
However, the Cold War ended abruptly with no war, therefore there was no 
definition of the new international structure. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, it 
created a wave of excitement and speculation throughout the world. The dissolution of 
the Soviet Union gave the USA uncontested power, at least in the first decade. In 1989, 
Francis Fukuyama published an article in the National Interest under the title of “the 
End of History” (1989)11, where he claimed capitalism displaced communism, and 
won the struggle between the two models. He further claimed democracy has won the 
battle and it had no alternative. The embodiment of both capitalism and democracy 
was the US and therefore it was read as the USA’s ultimate victory and ascension to 
hegemonic power. However, this optimism about the USA’s so-called ‘hegemonic 
power’ quickly collapsed. After an initial chaotic decade Russia came back to world 
politics as a regional power with ambitions to become a great power under Vladimir 
Putin’s presidency. China, empowered by the Western investments in its country, 
started to employ its vast industrial capacity to dominate, or at least influence, the third 
world and more worrisome it started to expand its military capacity and as of 2015 it 
is the most problematic revisionist country in Asia. The lack of a new international 
order, and the USA’s eagerness to declare itself as the ultimate winner left the 
international system in chaos. The USA’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 was done without 
the consent of the UN or within any proper international law. The USA’s ‘reckless’ 
                                                          
 
10 By definition a great power is also a hegemonic regional power. Here I looked to how China and 
Russia exert influence in their region, rather than reducing them to a regional power. 
11 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”, The National Interest, No:16 Summer, (1989). 
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actions ruined the perception of the US hegemony. With the USA’s economic decline 
there are many challengers to its so-called ‘hegemonic’ power. In 1999 Huntington 
wrote: 
Global Politics have moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War to a 
unipolar moment. But the superpower’s effort to maintain a unipolar system 
stimulates greater effort by the major powers to move toward a multipolar one. 
Now the international system is passing through one or two uni-multipolar 
decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century.12 
Now, true to his words, the world is experiencing the uni-multi polar decades 
that Huntington mentioned and the rising Russia and China are marking the “truly 
multipolar 21st century” Huntington predicted. But more importantly this unipolar 
system is not only challenged by Russia and China, but also latecomer rising powers 
and ex-powers. Brazil, Turkey, India, Germany, and Japan are among such contenders. 
Although such second tier powers do not poses enough military or economic power to 
directly challenge or replace the current hegemon, they have a growing role in the 
current power structure and international politics. Especially since the September 11 
attacks, the limits of the US power have been challenged continuously. The decline of 
US economic power, social problems and the burden of the military on the US budget 
show the next decades may not go smoothly for the USA. These rising powers keep 
challenging the current international structure in several fields including economics, 
military, and lately the UN. Brazil, Turkey, India, and Japan are among the countries 
that are criticizing the permanent spots on the UN Security Council and their veto 
powers and are calling for restructuring the UN system.13 Yet not all rising powers 
have the same agenda. Germany tries to be more influential in Europe, Turkey is trying 
to become more active in the Islamic world and the Middle East, Japan is trying to 
achieve a more representative role for its developed economy and solve its security 
problems regarding China. Brazil and India are trying to become more active in 
international politics. As can be seen while some of the rising powers have regional 
plans, others may have more global desires, and it is difficult to guess what any of 
                                                          
 
12 Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign Affairs 78 (1999): 35. 
13 Jo Adetunji, “Turkey calls for UN security council reform over failure to pressure Syria”, the 
Guardian, 13 October 2012, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/13/turkey-un-security-council-reform-syria 
Andreas Rinke, “Germany’s Merkel says U.N. Security Council must be reformed”, Reuters, 26 
September 2015. Accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.Reuters.com/article/us-un-
assembly-merkel-idUSKCN0RQ0NC20150926 
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these countries will seek if they achieve their desires. For so long it was argued that 
because of economic interdependency China would never turn hostile towards other 
nations, however the latest Chinese military development and territorial disputes hint 
that this may prove to be wrong.14 
However, whether they are challenger or not the regional powers are an 
important part of the international system. Not all regional powers are revisionist 
challengers, and even when they are challengers they are still balancing actors in the 
international system. Most of the regional powers are an assurance for stability of their 
regions, and even when they are not providing security, their own stability is crucial 
to world stability. Without the Russian security umbrella leadership ethnic conflicts, 
if not wars, may ignite throughout the ex-Soviet bloc. China is not a security provider, 
but the fact that China itself is stable, is a stabilizing factor for the whole world. If 
China was to fall into a civil war, as in the inter-bellum period, it would be disastrous 
for India, Korea, Russia, and Japan, and when the Syrian refugee crisis’ effects on 
Europe is taken into account, China with its population would create a wave of 
migration that would cause a butterfly effect which will flung the world in to chaos. 
Yet, just as they have positive effects in their respective regions, the regional powers 
may also have negative effects on regional stability. While the hegemonic power’s 
military build-up may not be perceived as a primary threat by regional powers, another 
regional power’s military build-up may trigger an arms race between two competing 
regional powers, as can be seen in the Indian-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese tensions 
or the Cold War era Iraqi-Iranian arms race and war. 
This thesis is based around the term of regional power and soft and hard powers, 
as aforementioned. Turkish and Japanese foreign policies cannot be understood 
without looking them as an effort to become a regional power. In the last ten years 
Turkey has been again and again voicing its desire under its then Prime Minister now 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Japan, although not voicing over such an argument, 
has been trying to contain Chinese power in its region and tried to be more involved 
in fields that previously it had never showed interest, like military. Comparisons 
between the policies of Turkey and Japan with those of the great powers will always 
show Turkish and Japanese foreign policies as failures, because they cannot compete 
                                                          
 
14 This will be explained broadly in the fourth chapter. 
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with great powers. For example, if Japanese foreign policy towards Central Asia is 
compared to that of Russia or China, it will surely look like a failure. But whether 
Japanese foreign policy towards Central Asia is failure or success should be judged by 
its initial aims and results. Therefore, comparing the foreign policies of two countries 
that have the same aim and similar problems makes more sense and provides better 
data to analyze whether such activities are yielding results and making progress or not. 
Also, while some regional powers, like Russia, rely more and more on hard 
power, soft power still deserves to be mentioned in any meaningful research regarding 
foreign policy. When we look at history, secondary powers usually replaced 
hegemonic powers first economically then militarily, like the US and the UK or the 
Netherlands and the Spanish Empire. In cases where the secondary powers directly 
tried military means as their main tool, they usually failed, as the Napoleonic France 
against Great Britain or Nazi Germany in the Second World War. While economic 
power is often read as hard power, today most of the foreign policy activities are 
interlocked, as these activities support one another and increase both soft power and 
hard power. When a state puts economic development assistance as an important part 
of its foreign policy tools, this raises its soft power and hard power. Financial aid a 
country raises both the reputation, soft power, and creates a stable market for its goods. 
The USA showed its hard power during the Second World War, but one of the actions 
which helped the USA to establish its image as a great power were the US’ aid plans, 
such as the Marshall Plan, and other independent acts, like Truman Doctrine. Such 
aids helped the USA to create dependable allies while showing its technological and 
economic capacity and improving its image. For these reasons this thesis focuses on 
Ankara and Tokyo’s foreign policy activities around the developments in their 
developmental aid, democracy promotion and military capabilities. 
1.2. Japan and Turkey 
The reasons why I choose Japan and Turkey is their very similar yet very 
distinctive structures and aims. Both Ankara and Tokyo are in a bid to become regional 
powers, and their situation and problems are very similar. Therefore, comparing their 
contemporary foreign policy makes more sense than comparing them with other 
countries. Also, this similarity provides an experiment where small differences in the 
appliance of the foreign policy may cause greatly different results. Turkey and Japan 
have historical, regional, economic and socio-political similarities.  
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Regionally, Turkey and Japan are in similar atmospheres. Turkey is in the 
Middle East, one of the most problematic regions of the world. With its diverse ethnic 
and religious differences, vast natural resources, and strategic location; conflict is an 
everyday part of the Middle East. In the past decades Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Israel faced internal and external problems and after the Arab Spring the ‘supposedly’ 
stable authoritarian countries like Yemen, Libya and Egypt are also in turmoil. 
Especially Iranian-Saudi and Iranian-Israeli rivalries, and their open hostility with one 
another create a tense situation. In the west, the Balkans have been somewhat stable in 
the last decade, but the current ethnic clashes in the Macedonia and the rising far-right 
with its revisionist rhetoric in Hungary marks possible future problems in the region. 
In the north a revisionist Russia with increasing hostilities towards neighbors with the 
recent annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine Crisis marks other problems. The 
problem Turkey is facing is not having hostile neighbors but having hostilities with 
them. Turkey has a maritime border crisis with Greece, has problems with Iraq 
regarding terrorist camps in Northern Iraq, the border gates are closed with Armenia 
due to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh province, and 
Turkey was on the brink of war with Syria in the 1990s and as of the end of 2015 there 
is no functioning state in Syria. This makes security a high priority for Turkish foreign 
policy. Similarly, Japan is located in a problematic part of current international 
politics. East Asia is not as strategically important as the Middle East, but nonetheless 
the countries are still problematic. Japan like Turkey has a history of hostility with its 
neighbors, which is caused by Japanese activities in the Second World War. But the 
problems are not only historic; Japan currently has territorial problems with its 
neighbors. Japan and Russia still have not solved the Northern Islands dispute since 
the end of the Second World War. There are problems with South Korea due to the 
Liancourt Rocks, with China and Taiwan due to the Senkaku Islands, and there are 
also North Korea’s nuclear weapons project and ballistic missile tests. And in addition 
to a revisionist Russia, Japan also borders an increasingly revisionist China. 
Historically both countries are ex-empires. Turkey was founded on the Ottoman 
Empire’s heritage and Japan was founded on the Japanese Empire’s heritage. Both 
heritages create historical enmities with their neighbors. During the Ottoman period, 
Turkey fought with most of its neighbors and countries in its near vicinity. Japan 
similarly fought with all of its neighbors. Both Japan and Turkey’s current regional 
rivalries are also based on historical rivalries, for Turkey these are Russia and Iran, for 
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Japan these are Russia and China. However, while Turkey’s Ottoman past is both a 
hindrance and a boost for Turkish foreign policy, Japan cannot use its imperial legacy. 
More importantly, as most of the ex-regional powers, Turkey and Japan’s bid to 
become a regional power again can be based on this historical influence. History 
creates an illusion, a nostalgia, which states take influence. Countries with a history of 
being great powers often try to become great powers again. Furthermore, history 
affects the route Tokyo and Ankara take. While Turkey’s Ottoman past influences its 
foreign policy towards Middle East and Balkans due to common past, Japan’s imperial 
past pushes it towards a more anti-militarist and pacifist approach. Also, this history 
limits their foreign policies. When Japan and Turkey try to become more active in their 
region, this activity is branded as “resurgence”, as can be seen from the reaction of 
regional leaders to Japan and Turkey.  
 Economically, Japan and Turkey are not in the same category when their GDP 
and economic development are taken into account, however the effect of resource 
dependency is the same for both countries. Japan is located in the East Asia without 
any significant natural resources. Among its neighbors only Russia has enough 
resources to export to Japan but the current infrastructure in the Eastern Russia is an 
obstacle in front of this option. Japan with its developed economy needs resources and 
obtaining such resources is one of the top priorities of Japanese foreign policy. Turkey 
is in a resource rich area but has limited natural resources of its own, and the consistent 
instability of the region is an obstacle in front of Turkey’s access to natural resources. 
Purchases from Azerbaijan have to take a longer route via Georgia due to the Armenian 
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran came under international economic sanctions 
several times and Turkey was pressured to not to buy natural gas from Iran. The Iraqi 
and Syrian borders with Turkey are dangerous areas and as of autumn 2015 beyond 
the Turkish border in the south there is only chaos. This pressure on resource access 
limits Turkish foreign policies towards certain countries. This reliance puts Turkey in 
to a dangerous dependence until it can diversify its resource providers in the future. 
Politically, both Japan and Turkey are parliamentary democracies. Their 
democratization and liberalization process started around the same time in the late 19th 
century when both countries were trying to modernize themselves in order to survive 
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against Western colonialism.15 However, both countries turned into authoritarian 
regimes shortly afterwards and it was not until the end of the Second World War that 
there were multi-party systems. However, while Japan quickly turned into a dominant 
party system Turkey remained multi-party system with several parties represented in 
its parliament. While in Turkey there was no party that truly dominated the political 
scene following the Second World War, except the Justice and Development Party’s 
(JDP) success in the last decade, in Japan the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) has 
dominated the Japanese politics since the Cold War and only lost twice in the elections. 
In the current political spectrum Japan and Turkey share another similarity in the 
political arena. Japan’s ambition to become a regional power is embodied in Shinzo 
Abe and the LDP, while the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is proposing 
a more inward approach and promise to make Japan’s internal problems a top priority. 
Similarly, Turkey’s regional power ambition is embodied in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
and the JDP, and the greatest opposition party the Republican People’s Party (RPP) 
proposes to prioritize Turkey’s internal problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
15 Ottoman Empire became a constitutional monarchy in 1876 and Japan in 1890. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
AID, A USEFUL TOOL IN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
2.1. Aid and its Role in Foreign Policy 
Aid is a tool that has been used in the policymaking process in international 
relations for a long time. It is a tool that can be beneficial for the donee country, as it 
will cover its needs; from funding economic growth to fulfilling military needs. But it 
is also useful for the donor, as it can be used for military, diplomatic or economic 
reasons by the donor. From influencing alignments to strengthening allies, foreign aid 
can help to stabilize, reconstruct and improve a country, and this will help the donor 
country to improve its reputation and soft power on the donee and will have direct 
political, economic and military effects. 
First, the donor country can use its influence on the donee at the political and 
diplomatic stage; both in regional or international organizations, such as the UN 
voting. The UN’s egalitarian “one country, one vote” system makes every country in 
the world equally important, a resolution may be refused even before any veto from 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council. So a donor country can try to 
influence the votes of its donee countries to pass a resolution or elections for the UN 
Security Council. 
Second, as the donor country invests in the stability and reconstruction of the 
donee, it creates a new market where, thanks to its influence and image as the donor, 
it will have a leading role. Especially, since some of the donee countries do not have 
functioning economies because of their instability, a latecomer country can compete 
with big powers. This factor can be used to explain the tendency of the rising 
economies, such as India16, Turkey and China17, great interest in aiding the African 
nations. A latecomer country can still compete with the big economies in the newly 
stabilized countries because no one will have experience in the market, ties with the 
                                                          
 
16 Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, (Washington 
DC: World Bank Publications, 2007). 
17 Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, China’s Engagement in Africa – Opportunities and Risks for 
Development, (Echborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2008). 
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local government or institutionalization in the region, because it is a newly opened 
market. 
Third, the donor can use its power to keep the donee in its military alliance, 
obtain military bases, or even support some military operation. For example, Georgia 
politically or militarily had nothing to do with the 2003 invasion of Iraq but it sent a 
total number of 2.000 soldiers to Iraq, and became one of the biggest contributors to 
acquire the US military support.18 As can be seen, a country that has no relationship to 
a war can send its soldiers to acquire the support it needs from the donor on other 
fields. 
Aid has been used as a tool in foreign policy on several occasions, as military 
and economic aid from France to the Thirteen Colonies in the American War of 
Independence against the British Empire. France starting from the early days of the 
war supported Thirteen Colonies with arms and other materials and later entered the 
war. However, before the Second World War the use of aid as a foreign policy tool 
was limited and bound to situation, rather than being an organized action. One of the 
most extensive use of foreign aid as a means for foreign policy happened during the 
Second World War. The United States’ Lend-Lease Act, which was enacted on 11 
March 1941, was perhaps the first extensive use of material aid as a foreign policy tool 
in that scale. Under the Lend-Lease program the US started supplying Allied countries 
first Free France forces and the United Kingdom, and later the Soviet Union, 
Nationalist China, and other Allied and non-participant countries with food, arms and 
other materials needed for the continuation of the war.19 With Lend-Lease aids the 
USA intended to keep the Allies intact and encourage neutral countries to join Allies, 
or at least discourage them from joining Axis powers. The Lend-Lease shipments, 
which eventually started with major Allied countries, increased to a number over 30 
countries around the world including nearly all Allied nations, all Latin American 
countries, and Turkey. Not all of these countries were allies of the USA and some of 
                                                          
 
18 “Parliament Endorses Increase in Troop Levels in Iraq”, 8 June 2007, accessed on 10.01.20016  
accessed from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15242 
Andrew E. Kramer, “Georgia becomes an unlikely U.S. ally in Iraq”, New York Times, 8 October 
2007, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/news/08iht-
ally.4.7803155.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
19 The US supplied materials and arms to non-participating countries like Turkey, Ecuador or Chile 
hoping to influence them to enter the Second World War on the Allied side 
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them still kept being neutral until the very end of the war but the USA aided them to 
make sure that they do not approach the Axis block. The Lend-Lease Act helped the 
USA shape the foreign policy of many nations and gave it a leading role in the Cold 
War international structure. 
During the Cold War, with the polarization of the world between the USA and 
the Soviet Union and the de-colonization process, the aid towards the Third World 
countries increased. Both superpowers tried to ensure the loyalty of their allies and 
encourage neutral or the opposite block’s countries to join their block, especially the 
Third World countries, which by that time constituted a large part of the world after 
the de-colonization. After the war, the United States launched the Marshall Plan, which 
unlike the Lend-Lease Act, was not military but rather aimed to improve the industrial 
capacity of the benefiting nations after the destruction havocked by the Second World 
War. The Marshall Plan aimed to create strong and prosperous European allies20 for 
the United States that would become militarily and industrially capable of supporting 
the Western Block. The main beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan were allies of the 
United States during the Second World War, and to a lesser degree the Axis and neutral 
countries. Although the Marshall Plan was designed to fulfil the needs of the post-war 
Europe’s for economic development, there are few criticisms towards the actual effects 
of the Marshall Plan, especially by German economist Werner Abelshauser. 
Abelshauser states the economic reconstruction was already on a successful path in 
West Germany even before the first significant Marshall aid came.21 However, in most 
cases the Marshall Plan acted as the necessary catalyzer to start the development and 
reconstruction process. Other single acts were also implemented for Asian and Middle 
Eastern Countries, as the Truman Doctrine to support Greece and Turkey in their 
struggle against communism inside their countries. Greece experienced a civil war 
between 1946 and 1949, which left the country in bitter social division, and Turkey 
experienced pressure from the Soviet Union for military bases and border changes 
while it also had to deal with leftists inside. 
                                                          
 
20 Most of the aid that was done to Japan was given under Government and Relief in Occupied Areas. 
For further information SEE Nina Serfino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick N. Kanto, U.S. Occupation 
Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared, Congressional Research Service, 23 March 2006. 
Retrieved 25 April 2015, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33331.pdf 
21 Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschalnd 1945-1948; Die Rekonstruktion und 
Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone, (Stuttgart: Verlag-Anstalt, 1975). 
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While the United States sent help to its allies via abovementioned acts, the Soviet 
Union founded its own aid and economic integration organization named Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949. It consisted of the Soviet Union, 
Eastern European communist countries and later Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba. The 
major positive effect of the COMECON on its member states was the low oil and raw 
material prices resulting from the Soviet Union’s production. The COMECON 
initiated the economic rehabilitation of its members via its industrial and material help. 
There were also cases of direct aid towards specific countries by both the Soviet Union 
and the United States, as in Arab-Israeli or Indian-Pakistani conflicts, but those were 
mainly military aid and were not as organized as the COMECON or the Marshall Plan 
and were rather ad-hoc strategies to pull these countries in to their blocks. 
As can be seen the effects of foreign aid can range between small economic relief 
actions to military aids that can keep countries intact in the most devastating war. 
Although the effects of foreign aid is debatable, since as much as it may help a country 
to overcome its problems, it can create states that are chronically bound to foreign aid. 
However, one thing is undebatable and it is the role that aid can and is playing on the 
foreign policy of the done and the donor. 
2.2. Turkish Aid History and Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities 
During the Ottoman Empire, there were separate examples of Turkish aid 
towards a third country. One of the first examples happened between the Ottoman 
Empire and Sultanate of Aceh22 in Indonesia.23 The Sultanate of Aceh had clashes with 
the Portuguese during the 15th century as a part of the Portuguese expansion in the 
Indian Ocean. To resist Portuguese expansion the Sultanate of Aceh requested help 
from the Ottoman Empire, which was also trying to stop Portuguese expansion in the 
area. Ottoman Empire sent many missions to Aceh during the reign of Sultan Suleiman 
I and Selim II, and later continued sending aid to Aceh. However, these aids were 
officers to train troops, equipment and know-how to build weapons. Rather than 
creating long-term alliances, the help aimed to slow down or stall the expansion of a 
                                                          
 
22 The Sultanate of Aceh was a Muslim Indonesian Sultanate in the medieval Indonesia. People of 
Aceh has embraced Islam starting from 12th century via trade and other means rather than an Islamic 
conquest. Muslims in Indonesia founded several sultanates and the Sultanate of Aceh was one of the 
major ones. 
23 Andrew Peacoc and Annabel Teh Gallop (eds.), From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and 
Southeast Asia, (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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rival country. However, since the Ottoman Empire was in decline by the time the 
maritime developments like steam power made large-scale aids possible, the foreign 
aid could not be used as a political tool. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly founded Turkish Republic 
found itself economically and demographically devastated after a decade of 
continuous battle. The Turkish Republic, in its fragile economic state was a recipient 
of financial aid nearly half of its history, and still needs financial aid in some large 
projects today like the Marmaray.24 Although Turkey initially did not accept any 
foreign aid25 in its early years due to its reluctance caused by the Ottoman Empire’s 
loans and bankruptcy, with the start of the Cold War Turkey began receiving aid from 
the Western block on a large scale. During the start of the Cold War Turkey received 
economic and military aid from the US under the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the 
Marshall Plan in 1948. Until the 1990s because of Turkey’s economic weakness, 
Ankara could not pursue an aid policy that would be organized and continuous. Aid 
towards other countries was ad-hoc strategies that were separate and based on 
occasions rather than a systematic program with long term aims. 
One of the first developments in the Turkish Republic after the Cold War 
regarding becoming a donor was the founding of the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency (TIKA). TIKA was founded in 1992 by the Decree Law No. 480 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim; “to respond to the restructuring, 
adaptation and developmental needs of the Turkic (Turkish-speaking) Republics after 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union.”26 Later TIKA’s designated operational area 
was enlarged and as of 2015 TIKA conducts aid programs in 12027 countries 
throughout the world. There are also other state organizations like Kızılay, the Turkish 
Red Crescent, which conducted aid organizations inside Turkey but lately also 
conducts regular and permanent aid programs in other countries.  
                                                          
 
24 “The first rail welding Ceremony of Marmaray Project was held on January 14, 2012 in Istanbul in 
the Ayrılıkçeşme-Kazlıçeşme Part of the Project in İstanbul.”, JICA, 14 January 2012, accessed on 
10.01.2016 accessed from http://www.jica.go.jp/turkey/english/office/topics/news120114.html 
25 Except the Soviet and Indian Khilafat Movement’s aid during the Turkish War of Independence. 
26 “History of TIKA”, TIKA, 24 December 2014, accessed on 14.03.2016 accessed from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/history_of_tika-8526 
27“Overview of 2013 Activities”, TIKA 2013 Annual Report, p. 16, TIKA, accessed on 10.01.2016, 
accessed from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf 
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The state organizations are not the only organizations in Turkey that send 
humanitarian aid to other nations. Turkey has great non-state aid organizations as the 
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) or Kimse 
Yok Mu (KYM). 28 As of 2013 IHH serves in 136 countries29 and KYM serves in 113 
countries30. This means Turkey helps more than half of the world via its state, sub-
state, or civil society organizations.31 In 2013 the official development assistance 
(ODA) given by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee member countries rose by 6.1% and totaled 
$134.8 billion. In 2013 Turkey increased its ODA by 30% and reached a total of $3.3 
billion.32 This is a high ratio as Turkey is a country, which had $823 billion GDP in 
2013.33 If we also add the donations made by the NGO’s, Turkey might be one of the 
biggest donors compared to donation/GDP ratio. 
2.2.1. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Bosnia 
Since the 1990s the first massive aid Turkey made was to Bosnia during the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. Initially, Turkey, which was having a considerable separatist 
problem within and usually in favor of the status quo on international politics, 
supported the integrity of the Yugoslavia. However, after the recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia by the major European countries, Turkey recognized Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia on 6 February 1992. After initial confusion, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia turned in to a bloody civil war with usually more than 
two sides fighting against each other. The Yugoslav Wars (1992-1995) and the ethnic 
cleansing devastated Bosnia economically, politically and demographically, rendering 
it unable to achieve a permanent conciliation between three ethnicities. 
                                                          
 
28 Further information regarding Turkish NGOs that sends aid to third countries can be found in TIKA 
2011 Annual Report, p. 68-78, TIKA, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/kyr_ing.pdf 
29 IHH 2013 Annual Report, p. 11, IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from  
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30“About Kimse Yok Mu”, Kimse Yok Mu, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from 
http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/index.php?p=content&gl=temel_icerik&cl=kurumsal&l=hakkimizda 
31 There are currently 206 sovereign and de-facto states in the World. 
32 TIKA 2013 Annual Report, p.17; 
33 World Bank data on economic situation of Turkey, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey 
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Initially the Yugoslav Wars did not pose a threat to Turkey, as Turkey was 
geographically distant from the region so the wars could not spread to Turkey or affect 
the Turkish economy in a considerable way. However, historical, cultural, and 
religious ties with Bosnia and the Bosnian immigrant population in Turkey prompted 
a greater response from Ankara. Especially the scale of the ethnic cleansing, the 
inability of the UN to stop the war or protect the civilians34 and the hardships Bosnians 
were going through were the main reasons of Turkish aid campaigns. In other words, 
the widespread view that Turkey projected its soft power on Bosnia is true, but to a 
certain degree both countries used their soft power upon each other. 
During the Yugoslav Wars, or the Bosnian War, the UN resolutions prohibited 
the sale of arms to all ex-Yugoslav countries.35 Turkey as a member of the UN abided 
by those resolutions and most of its aid was done in accord to the resolutions. The 
greatest importance of the Yugoslav Wars for Turkey was the Turkish civil society 
and NGOs active participation in the aid. There were mass campaigns to raise money 
for Bosnians in Turkey and in European countries where a Turkish migrant population 
lived. Throughout Turkey there were fund-raising and charity organizations to provide 
money and material aid to Bosnia. Both local and big NGOs’ participated in these 
events. These aids were delivered to Bosnia by various means and as a consequence 
some of them went undocumented. However, the aid campaigns also showed a 
problem, the lack of experience and the organization. There were charges of swindle 
and misuse of the donations, and problems in the deliverance of the aid to the area. So 
in a sense the hardship faced in Bosnia aid campaigns also helped the success of later 
campaigns. After decades of idleness Yugoslav Wars provided the necessary catalyzer 
for institutionalization of Turkish aid. IHH, one of the biggest NGOs in Turkey, puts 
its foundation on the hardships they faced in the mobilization and organization during 
the Yugoslav Wars.36 
                                                          
 
34 The UN designated several safe zones in the region, however the UN peacekeeping forces had 
difficulties to protect the civilians, and in Srebrenica the Netherland Peace Keeping Forces abandoned 
their position rather than fighting with paramilitaries. Between 11 July and 13 July 1995 within a few 
days over 8,000 Bosnians were massacred by the Serbian paramilitary groups. 
35 Those resolutions was one of the reasons of the hardships Bosnians went through. Serbians had 
access to major Yugoslavian army stockpiles in the region, Croats had an extensive shore with plenty 
bays where they could smuggle weapons. Bosnians were stuck between two hostile populations and 
had to mainly rely on scavenged or captured weapons. 
36“Brief History”, IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from 
http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/tarihce/338 
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Turkey’s aid to Bosnia did not end after the Yugoslav Wars. TIKA continues to 
support dozens of projects in Bosnia, supporting cultural, educational or economic 
organizations and helping the infrastructure of the country as well as preserving the 
Turkish heritage in Bosnia. On calamities, as in the 2014 South Eastern European 
Flood, there were special aids sent to Bosnia to use on the disasters. In a disaster where 
hundreds of houses were put out-of-use and nearly 40,000 people were displaced, 
while the UN Development Program paid for the reconstruction of the 30 houses TIKA 
paid for 640, and IHH paid for 300.37 
2.2.2. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Somalia 
Africa is one of the regions that gets a great amount of official development 
assistance (ODA) in the world. Most of the continent is agonizing under poverty, civil 
wars, insurgencies, ecological problems and many other issues. Apart from a few 
countries like Botswana, nearly all countries faced and continue to face ethnic conflicts 
or civil wars after their independence and more than half of the continent is considered 
fragile states.38 One of the most severe cases of civil wars in Africa happened in 
Somalia. After its independence Somalia experienced a military coup, and was ruled 
by a military regime for over twenty years. Since 2005 Somalia has been trying to 
rebuild its infrastructure, governance and economy while still fighting a low-intensity 
war with pocket resistances inside country. Turkey is one of the countries that have 
been trying to help Somali society on their efforts to rebuild. Turkey demonstrated 
special interest in Somalia and its re-construction, both in terms of state-building and 
economic restoration. In 2010 and 2012 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Istanbul 
Somalia Conferences organized within the UN framework under the theme of 
“Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015”.39  
                                                          
 
37“Bosnia: Turkish aid agency restores flood-damaged homes.”, Anadolu Agency, 05 December 2014, 
accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/bosnia-turkish-aid-agency-
restores-flood-damaged-homes/95222 
“Turkey extends helping hand to Bosnia and Herzegovina flood victims”, Today’s Zaman, 18 May 
2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_turkey-extends-
helping-hand-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina-flood-victims_348096.html 
38 Fragile State Index is an index published by the Fund for Peace organization. It publishes the Failed 
States Index, an annual ranking of 177 countries by 12 indicators like demographic pressures, group 
grievances, economic decline and etc. For 2014 report; http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2014 
Accessed, 02.05.2015 
39 “The Second İstanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, 1 June 2012, İstanbul”, Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
second-istanbul--conference-on-somalia_-final-declaration_-1-june-2012_-istanbul.en.mfa 
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Turkey’s aids to Somalia for its reconstruction are done through several 
organizations like, TIKA, Kızılay, IHH and KYM. From 2008 to 2013 the annual share 
of spending Somalia received from the TIKA’s annual budgets increased from 0.16% 
in 2008 to 9.57% in 2013.40 As of the end of the 2013, Somalia was the third largest 
recipient of TIKA aid, coming only after Palestine and Tunisia. Considering that TIKA 
is operating in more than 120 countries, this demonstrates how much Turkey is putting 
on the reconstruction of Somalia. Among the TIKA aid given to Somalia, nearly 22% 
was spent on health-care and 70% is spent on economic infrastructure and services. 
This infrastructure investment went to projects that aim to restore the economic and 
social recovery of the country, like opening wells, a hospital, material help to 
orphanages and roads.41 
Another Turkish state organization, which aids Somalia, is Kızılay. Since 2011 
Kızılay has been sending help to Somalia. In August 2011 Kızılay started building a 
tent-camp, which consisted of 3,000 tents to accommodate 15,000 people. Also, they 
opened wells, fountains, school, a masjid and social activity buildings, so their tent-
camp turned into a small town to not only preserve their lives, but also restore the 
social life. Between August 2011 and October 2014 the Turkish Red Crescent sent 
44.356 tons of provisions to Somalia, which was very important for the region, where 
agricultural capacity was devastated from the war and drought. Also, with the help of 
the Istanbul Municipality, Kızılay opened, repaired or improved roads, buildings, the 
sewage system and other infrastructure in several Somali towns upon the request of 
their local governments.42 
IHH also sends aid to Somalia. IHH’s involvement in Somalia began earlier than 
others, as early as 2006. IHH both helps Somalia in terms of provisions and 
infrastructure. IHH built the biggest orphanage in Somalia, which was opened by 
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud. This orphanage includes a school, and is 
                                                          
 
40 %0.16 in 2008, %0.19 in 2009, %0.26 in 2010, %0.94 in 2011, %2.28 in 2012 and %9.57 in 2013. 
TIKA 2013 Annual Report, p. 163. 
41 For detailed information on TIKA’s aid to Somalia see; TIKA 2012 Annual Report, p. 57-58, TIKA, 
accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/oldpublication/TurkishDevelopmentAssistance2012.pdf and TIKA 2013 
Annual Report, p. 163-165. 
42 For further information on Kızılay’s aid to Somalia see; “Mart 2015 Somali İnsani Yardım 
Operasyonu”, Kızılay, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://www.kizilay.org.tr/upload/Dokuman/Dosya/62306176_somali-insani-yardim-operasyonu-mart-
2015.pdf 
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planned to accommodate 400 children and the school will have capacity for 1500 
students’ education.43 In Somalia, IHH looks after 600 orphans via its Sponsor Family 
System. As of 2011, 340 wells were opened and 46 more are still in progress and there 
are plans to open additional wells in suitable locations. IHH also with the aid of TIKA 
co-founded an Agriculture Faculty to train qualified people to make sure drought and 
food-shortages will not happen, or not affect as much as they do now, in the future.44 
IHH also provides provisions and medical supplies as emergency aid when needed.45 
KYM does not get involved in infrastructure projects like other organizations, 
but mainly serves via the refugee camps it opened. KYM opened 7 different refugee 
camps and sent tons of medical and other aid supplies. Alone their aid is worth 
58.242.808 TRY of the total aid to Somalia,46 which as of the date of the news was 
worth nearly 26.470.000 USD. For their services in Somalia, KYM received the 
outstanding service award from Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.  
2.2.3. Contemporary Turkish Aid Activities: Gaza 
While Turkish aid towards Bosnia is the most known example among the 
generation of which the members are around 40 years old, Gaza is the most known for 
the new generation. Gaza and the West Bank are the two regions that form Palestine. 
After HAMAS’s political victory in the 2006 elections, Israel started an extensive 
economic blockade against the Gaza Strip, to pressure HAMAS to step down from the 
government and to prevent rocket attacks from Gaza to Israeli territory. 47 Although 
                                                          
 
43“IHH opened largest orphanage in Somalia”, IHH, 22 May2013, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed 
from http://afrika.ihh.org.tr/en/main/news/2/ihh-opened-largest-orphanage-in-somalia/1723 
44 “First Faculty of Agriculture in Somalia”, IHH, 17 December 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, 
accessed from http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16/ihhnin-destegiyle-somaliye-ilk-ziraat-
fakulte/2656 
“Good news from Agricultural School in Somalia”, IHH; 26 April 2014, accessed on 10.01.2016, 
accessed from http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16/somalideki-tarim-okulumuzdan-guzel-
haberler-v/1685 
45 “IHH Somalia Relief Activities”, IHH, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/pages/ihh-somalia-relief-activities/271 
For additional information regarding IHH’s activities in Somalia can be found in; IHH’s Somalia 
activities news page, IHH, accessed on 25.04.2015, accessed from 
http://www.ihh.org.tr/en/main/region/somali/16 Accessed 25.04.2015 
46 “Kimse Yok Mu Somali’de Neler Yaptı?”, Zaman, 14 September 2014, accessed on 07.04.2015 
accessed from http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_kimse-yok-mu-somalide-neler-yapti_2244203.html 
47 HAMAS is a political organization in Palestine which has its own paramilitary group, Izz ad-Din 
Qassam Brigades. Because of the rocket attacks on the Israeli territory HAMAS is considered as a 
terrorist group in some countries. In Australia, New Zealand and the UK, military wing is listed as 
terrorist organization. But in Canada, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Egypt and the United States, Hamas as a 
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Israeli officials explained this blockade as a pre-emptive measure to cripple rocket 
attacks, most of the listed items had nothing to do with rockets, and were not even 
dual-use items, which could be used in the production of weapons or ammunitions in 
any way.48 This blockade left the region dependent on aids from the UN and other 
countries’ NGOs on healthcare and other fields. As a result of the economic sanctions 
and the Israeli military operations, the Gaza Strip is economically crippled and the 
infrastructure devastated by Israeli military operations cannot be repaired. When the 
population and density49 of the place is added, Gaza is in a state of emergency that 
rivals some African countries.  
Because of this, Turkey sends help to Palestine, especially to Gaza. TIKA and 
IHH are among the biggest contributors of Turkish aid to Palestine. Prior to 2010 
Turkish aid towards Palestine could not reach Gaza because of the blockade and the 
ongoing Israeli military operations, and as a result, most of the Turkish aid could only 
reach the West Bank. However, after the end of the military operations and the 
lightening of the sanctions, Turkish aid started to reach Gaza. Palestine’s share from 
TIKA’s annual budget increased from 2.20% in 2008 to 18.02% in 2013.50 The greatest 
obstacle for the aid was the military operations. Military operations ruined the already 
suffering region. During the military operations Turkey airlifted injured people to 
Turkey for advanced medical care that could not be provided in Gaza. The medical 
emergency the Strip is experiencing can be understood from TIKA’s spending in the 
region, 89.64% of the budget went to health-care spending in 2013.51 
IHH also sent aid to Gaza. Unlike some organizations IHH did not obey the 
blockade order by Israel and tried to break it, however this resulted in the Mavi 
                                                          
 
whole is listed as terrorist organization. The EU listed Hamas as a terrorist organization in the past, 
but renounced its status later. 
48“Partial List of Items Prohibited/Permitted into the Gaza Strip”, Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of 
Movement, May 2010, However it should be noted that this is the list after some of the sanctions were 
lightened, Accessed on 25.04.2015, Accessed from 
http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/HiddenMessages/ItemsGazaStrip060510.pdf 
49 Gaza has a population of nearly 1.8 million people living in just 360 sq.km. Which means its 
population density is nearly 5,000 person per sq.km. “Gaza Strip”, Central Intelligence Agency: The 
World Factbook, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/gz.html 
50 %2.20 in 2008, %2.31 in 2009, %3.31 in 2010, %9.00 in 2011, %15.59 in 2012, and %18.02 in 
2013. TIKA 2013 Annual Report, p. 135. In page 20 the figure is %20.20 but I took the figures from 
the Palestine part of the report. 
51 TIKA 2013 Annual Report, p. 135 
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Marmara incident.52 During the Mavi Marmara incident, where one IHH ship was a 
part of an international aid flotilla, but the IHH ship the Mavi Marmara was stormed 
by the Israeli commandos and this incident lead to the death of 10 aid activists.53 IHH 
did not stop sending aid to Gaza after the Mavi Marmara incident. IHH sends 
provisions to the families that are affected by the Israeli military strikes, who could 
not look after their families. During the winter of 2014, IHH delivered food and cash 
as aid to 3,500 people who lost their homes and jobs during the Israeli military 
operations during the summer.54 
Since 2008 Kızılay sent more than 2,285 tons of provisions to Gaza.55 Kızılay 
also brought fabric worth $762,000 to help stimulate production and trade in Gaza, 
which was donated by the Turkish Chamber of Commerce. The water treatment and 
pipeline system, which were partially damaged in the 2008 military operations, were 
also repaired by Kızılay. Since 2008 Kızılay provided aid, worth more than $6.6 
million, and the majority of the donations were medical aid. Ironically, after all 
arguments and accusations, most of the Turkish aid to Gaza is delivered via the gate 
on the Israel border, the Kerem Shalom gate, in coordination with the Israeli army, 
since the Rafah gate on the Egyptian border is closed to the passage of goods.56 
2.3. Japanese Aid History and Contemporary Japanese Aid 
Japan has a different donorship history compared to Turkey. First of all, Japan’s 
major donation activities are carried out by the state; therefore Japan has an official 
rhetoric and categorization regarding its aid programs. Second, Japan’s aid history 
started very early compared to Turkey, while Turkey became a donor in the early 
                                                          
 
52 The IHH ship Mavi Marmara, which was the flagship of a larger flotilla of international aid to Gaza, 
did not obey the Israeli instructions to stop for inspection and direction to an Israeli port. Israeli 
boarding resulted with death of 10 activists and the detainment of the ship and the activists. 
53 Ian Black. “Israeli attack on Gaza flotilla sparks international outrage”, The Guardian, 31 May 
2010, accessed on 24.06.2016, accessed from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/israeli-attacks-gaza-flotilla-activists 
54 “IHH’s in-kind and financial aid to Gaza”, IHH, 16 December 2014, Accessed from http://filistin-
gazze.ihh.org.tr/en/main/news/0/ihhs-in-kind-and-financial-aid-to-gaza/2653 accessed on 25.04.2015 
55 “Gazze İnsani Yardım Operasyonu Mart 2015”, Kızılay, accessed from 
https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/03975851_gazze-insani-yardim-operasyonu-mart-
2015.pdf accessed on 05.05.2015 
56 Sevil Erkuş, “Turkey increases aid to Gaza through Israeli crossing”, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 July 
2014, access on 05.05.2015, accessed from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-increases-aid-
to-gaza-through-israeli-crossing.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69074&NewsCatID=510  
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1990s, Japan became a donor as early as early the 1950s.57 Japan’s relationship with 
aids, like Turkey, started as an aid recipient during the Cold War. After the Second 
World War Japanese economy was in great disarray. The zaibatsus58 were targeted for 
dissolution under the US occupation to give way to more competitive free market 
economy and to prevent the big industrial groups to effect Japanese politics again. 
However, this created havoc in the highly organized Japanese economy. Also, the 
heavy bombardments during the Second World War left most of the industries in ruins, 
and Japan itself was in need of foreign aid. Ironically, this aid came from the US, who 
was responsible for the destruction, and the newly founded World Bank.59 Japan used 
the grants and loans to invest in infrastructure and heavy industry such as highways, 
railroads, dams, and the coal, steel and shipbuilding industries, which would give 
immediate effect on the Japanese economic-recovery. 
For Japanese foreign policy, ODA loans and grants are an important tool. Japan 
is far from strategic regions, like the Balkans or the Middle East, and is surrounded by 
powerful neighbors, like China and Russia. To pursue an active foreign policy Japan 
has to look in over-seas regions. When we consider Japan does not have an army, the 
most powerful tool in Japanese toolbox is economy. Therefore, the loans and grants 
constitute an important part of Japanese foreign policy, as it is stated on the website of 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Indeed, official development assistance is the most important instrument of 
foreign policy of Japan that is determined to promote peace and its important 
vehicle for international contribution. Japan itself has had the experience of 
reconstructing its war-torn economy with the help of other countries before it 
become one of the leading donor countries of the world. Today, it has financial 
and technological resources to help other countries develop their economies. 
Economic aid to developing countries is the very area to which Japan can 
actively contribute by bringing its experience and resources. In step with the 
                                                          
 
57 But this is debatable, in early 1950s the “aids” that were given by the Japan were mainly war 
reparations. If we don’t count the war reparations as aid, the date will be 1960s.I took the 1990s as the 
start of Turkey’s donorship date because prior to that Turkey’s humanitarian aids were occasional 
rather than a systematic and continuous activity. 
58 Zaibatsu’s were a type of business groups that were unique to Japan which resembled the post-Cold 
War oligarchs of the Eastern Bloc countries. They were very big business groups, who were usually 
ruled by one family and had their own parties and their affiliations with military. They were one of the 
main pursuers and supporters of the Japanese expansion. 
59 The aid that Japan received a total amount of roughly $15.2 billion dollars, in 2005 values. %77 was 
grants and %23 was loans. Most of those grants were given through Government Aid and Relief in 
Occupied Areas grants. Nina Serfino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick N. Kanto, U.S. Occupation Assistance: 
Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared, Congressional Research Service, 23 March 2006. 
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changes occurring in the environment surrounding official development 
assistance, needs for ODA have increased and diversified – so much so that the 
importance of ODA will grow, not decline, and the role Japan can play in this 
area will take on growing importance in coming years.60 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorizes Japanese aid history in five 
periods61: 
Period I Japan as a foreign aid recipient. 
Period II: Post-war war reparations. 
Period III: Quantitative expansion of aid. 
Period IV: Systematic donorship. 
Period V: Japan as top donor. 
But when it is read carefully, the official categorization is a bit problematic. 
Adding war reparations to Japan’s aid history might be an error. War reparations were 
paid to compensate the damage caused by the Japanese armies in the Second World 
War, and are more of an obligation than voluntary acts. Thus it should be excluded 
from the aid history of Japan, even if it is not excluded it should not be noted as ‘aid-
giving’. 
Compared to Turkey, an overwhelming portion of Japanese aid is done by the 
state, via grants and ODA loans. Such grants and loans are done via three state 
institutions, the Japanese Exim Bank, the Overseas Economic Corporation Fund 
(OECF) and the Japanese International Corporation Agency (JICA). Exim Bank 
started as Export Bank, later turned into Exim Bank with its changing role and after 
initial procedures it was permitted to give loans to foreign governments and 
corporations. The OECF is responsible for the ODA loans. The JICA is responsible 
for giving grants, loans and technical assistance, and is the Japanese equivalent of the 
Turkish TIKA. 
Although it is a bit controversial to add the war reparations to the history of 
Japanese donorship, since it is a part of the official categorization it should be 
mentioned. Japan officially paid war reparations only to four countries for its actions 
                                                          
 
60 “Japan’s ODA Annual Report (Summary) 1994: The Significance of ODA to Japan”, Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1994/2.html 
61 Furuoka, Fumitaka, A History of Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy: From Physical Capital to Human 
Capital, MPRA Paper 5654, University Library of Munich, (2007). Accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed 
from http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2010/FuruokaOishiKato.html 
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in the Second World War; Myanmar, Indonesia, South Vietnam and the Philippines.62 
Major participants of the Second World War waived all reparations claims from the 
war. However, Japan later paid reparations, or quasi-reparations as they are generally 
called, to other countries in the region, and outside of the region, for the damage caused 
in the Second World War.63 Such reparations and quasi-reparations were mostly done 
between the 1950s and 1960s, although some stretched to the 1980s. These early 
payments helped the countries in the region stabilize their newly founded countries 
after centuries of colonization. Thus, while creating a stable and secure environment 
for Japan and helping its security, the aids also helped create stable markets for 
Japanese products in this newly founded countries. 
Starting from the 1950s Japan began limited scale donations to the UN and other 
international development programs. In 1952 Japan started contributing to the United 
Nations’ Expanded Program for Technical Assistance, which was a predecessor of 
current the United Nations Development Program with an initial donation of $80,000. 
In 1961 Japan joined the International Development Association, a World Bank 
affiliation. Japan contributed $33.5 million to the total starting capital of $1 billion.64 
Japan was among the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and is still one of the biggest funders of the organization. Japan made an 
initial contribution of $200 million to ASEAN’s founding fund, which was equal to 
the US’s contribution. Also, although Japan cannot send combatants due to its 
constitution, Japan also helps monetarily the UN on Peacekeeping Missions or sends 
technical assistance teams to such missions. 
Tokyo’s first official loan to a country on a government-to-government level was 
given to India to support India’s Second Five-Year Plan in 1958. Later same year Japan 
also joined a World Bank consortium on India. In 1958 Japan joined another World 
                                                          
 
62 “History Issues Q&A, Q3”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on 10.01.2016, accessed 
from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html 
63 Those countries are; Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Micronesia and 
Mongolia. Burma also received money in both official reparations and quasi-reparations. Also there 
were some payments to Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom for damages 
occurred during the Second World War. Shinji Takagi, “From Recipient to Donor: Japan’s Official 
Aid Flows 1945 to 1990 and Beyond”, Essays in International Finance No: 196 (March 1995), p.10-
11, accessed on 10.01.2016 accessed from http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Essays/E196.pdf 
64 Ibid., 15. 
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Bank consortium on Pakistan. Between 1958 and 1965 Japan gave ten countries loans 
that were worth over $900 million.65  
One of the most interesting cases of Japanese ODA loans was China. China after 
a long civil war formed a socialist state and joined the Eastern Block. However, after 
the death of its founding leader, Mao Zedong, China started a very ambitious 
modernization plan and requested aid from Japan, which up to that date Beijing had 
refused despite Tokyo’s offer. Japan agreed to lend to China in 1980, which made 
Japan the first non-socialist country in the world to help China. After that, Japan 
continued to be one of the major investors in China. Japanese total ODA loans 
surpassed Germany in 1983, France in 1986 and the USA in 1989 and thus Japan 
became the world’s biggest donor, with an amount that nearly reached $9 billion.66 In 
2013, Japan contributed more than $8.81 billion in form of grants and loans, and 
contributed another $2.97 billion to international organizations. 2013 Japanese ODA 
contributions were increased nearly 11% from the previous year on a dollar basis.67 
Since Tokyo started giving ODA loans, they were received by at least 185 countries68, 
and in 2013 it was received by 169 countries.69 
The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was founded in 1974, 
although its predecessors were established in the 1950s and 1960s. Since its foundation 
the JICA participated in many projects, eventually starting with the South and South 
East Asia but later covering many parts of the world. Since founding, the JICA sent 
more than 136,500 experts and 46,000 volunteers throughout the world. Unlike the 
TIKA, the JICA directly aims to create a market for Japanese companies in the 
countries it invests. In the goals section of JICA’s 2014 Annual Report, among its aims 
are stated, “assistance for emerging and developing countries to grow together with 
Japan, promotion of Human Security and Peacebuilding, and promotion of private 
                                                          
 
65 Ibid., 14. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
67 Japanese ODA’s year-on-year increase was 35.9 percent on Yen basis. But due to the Yen’s loss of 
value against USD, increase was lower in dollar basis. JICA 2014 Annual Report p. 14, JICA, 
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68 “Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2004, Part 1”, Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
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sector collaborations and domestic collaboration.”70 As can be seen, while the TIKA 
is mainly focusing on providing infrastructure and provisions that are needed in 
emergency situations and does not actively pursue a policy of Turkish companies’ 
involvement; the JICA tries to encourage economic partnership between the donees 
and Japanese firms, thus while investing in those countries also creates contracts for 
Japanese firms. 
Japan’s extensive use of finance in its foreign policy was quite successful for 
maintaining the access to resources. However, in some cases it backfired. One of the 
cases was the Gulf War. Because of the constitutional restrictions Japan could not 
dispatch troops to the Gulf War, but made extensive financial contribution to the 
campaign and nearly paid $13 billion with today’s value, which was more than any of 
the contributors including the USA. Although Japan funded nearly half of the 
operations, its checkbook diplomacy went unnoticed. When the government of Kuwait 
thanked the UN coalition, Japan was not among the dozens of countries which was 
listed there. This failure strengthened the desire for the constitutional change that tied 
Japan militarily.71 This shame, of being unable to do anything, was the tipping point 
against the pacifism and gave way to increased desire to change the constitutional 
burden on the armed forces. 
2.3.1. Contemporary Japanese Aid Activities: Myanmar 
Japanese ODA plans are usually based on regions, rather than countries. For 
example, when Japan started its “New Silk Road” policy it focused on all countries in 
the region rather than skipping some of them. But there are a few exceptions for that, 
and the latest exception is Myanmar.72 The importance of the Myanmar for Japanese 
foreign policy is that, Myanmar constitutes the link between Indochina and India, thus 
it is an important part of the Japanese containment policy towards China. To this end 
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Japan has been on competition with China to establish good relations with Myanmar 
since the Myanma junta’s democratization, or opening process.73 
Myanmar has a special place in the Japanese aid history, because it was the first 
country Japan started to pay war reparations, after former’s independence from the 
British colonial rule. Myanmar is a country with divided social structure. It is home to 
several ethnic and religious groups, which causes strife in the society. In 1962 this 
instability brought a coup, and Myanmar was turned into a socialist republic. During 
the military junta’s regime Myanmar turned into one of the poorest countries in the 
world. Since 2011, Myanmar is on its way to democratization, although there are 
critiques to the credibility of this democratization process. 
With this new era in the country’s history, Japan restarted its investments in 
Myanmar. Starting with an initial $60 million grant in 2011, the amount quickly 
increased to $2.3 billion loans and $322 million grant in 2012, and $485 million loan 
and $186 million grant in 2013 and as a further aid Tokyo cleared nearly $2.8 billion 
loan debt.74 Japan also helped Myanmar to re-enter to ASEAN, which Myanmar itself 
quit during military regime. By adding Myanmar back to ASEAN and to its aid plans, 
Japan is investing and aiding all countries in South and South East Asia. 
Japanese aid in Myanmar focuses on psychical investments rather than bringing 
provisions to the country. The JICA does the investments with the cooperation of 
Japanese private firms. The JICA focuses on funding infrastructure throughout 
Myanmar to open way for further Japanese investments from private sector, 
transportation network, dams, government buildings, banks and stock market. This 
way the JICA is creating a functioning economy, which will be ready for further 
investment from private sector in the upcoming years, thus ending the need for official 
aid.75 
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2.4. Evaluation 
As in the case of most of the aid campaigns in the world, Turkish or Japanese 
aid campaigns are not solely humanitarian. It can be said that both countries are using 
aids to create ‘benign power’ image as well as supplementing other policies, like their 
security policy. 
For Turkey’s bid to become a regional power, the countries in the region are 
more important than countries that are distant from Turkey. This is primarily because 
of economic and diplomatic reasons, if not military. Turkey has historical, religious 
and cultural ties with the countries in its region, which make it easier for Turkey to 
interact with the region. But the extent of Turkey’s region is not very clear. Balkans, 
Middle East and Central Asia can all be named as Turkey’s region, as well as North 
Africa and East Europe. This ambiguity overstretches Turkey, and Turkey’s own 
ambition to help worldwide overstretches already stretched organizations. Since the 
end of the Cold War, eventually starting with countries in its region and ex-Soviet 
Turkic republics, Turkey became the fourth- largest donor in 2012 in the world.76 For 
Turkey donations have two main aims; first diplomatic and second economic.  
Turkey is a latecomer rising economy; therefore Turkey needs both markets to 
sell its products and the resources for those products. As a rising economy it is easier 
for Turkey to establish its presence on newly created markets than already established 
ones. Because of such reasons, Turkey considers Asia and Africa as markets where it 
can compete. And this is actively supported by business groups in Turkey, which can 
be seen from activities of Turkish businessman organizations, such as TUSKON.77 
TUSKON organized 5 international summits regarding economic relations with 
different regions, three summits on Africa, one summit on Eurasia, and one summit on 
Asia-Pacific region.78  
Regarding Turkey’s relations with Africa the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ website page focuses on two aspects of the continent; historical and cultural 
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ties and Africa’s economic potential via its resources and population.79 This shows the 
state is looking at the region as an economic zone that can be coordinated for the 
Turkish economic aims, and if Turkey is to raise its power it needs to improve its 
economic power.80 Cooperation between state and non-state actors in Turkey for a 
stronger economy is one of the pillars for the bid to become a regional power. As 
Ahmet Davutoğlu states in Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy the coherence 
between states macro-level strategies and business sectors micro-level strategies is a 
key, which will make Turkey successful at a global scale.81 
During the Cold War, Turkey showed very little interest in Africa. Due to 
Turkey’s limited economic capacity, internal problems, and Turkey’s passive foreign 
policy Turkey’s initiative towards the continent was very limited. It was solely based 
on diplomatic level and there were limited relations in terms of economic activities or 
military cooperation. Turkey recognized most of the African countries after their 
independence in the de-colonization period. It was not until two decades after the end 
of the Cold War, Turkey started forming its own African policy. In 1998 Turkey 
announced its African Action Plan, its first initiative towards the continent. However, 
due to the economic and political instability there was no big change. After 2002, 
Turkish focus on Africa increased as a part of the JDP’s foreign policy. The new 
Turkish Foreign Policy towards Africa can be understood from the words of former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu who in his 
book stated that to make Turkey a global power it is not enough to only engage with 
the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Conference but also with Africa 
and Central Asia.82 In 2009 there were only 12 Turkish Embassies in the African 
countries, by the end of 2014 there were Turkish Embassies in 39 countries.83 2005 
was announced as “the year of Africa” in Turkey. In 2008 Turkey held the First 
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Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit with participation of 49 countries84 and 11 regional 
and international organizations, and Ankara was announced as strategic partner by the 
African Union. In 2014 the Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was held in 
Equatorial Guinea under the theme of “A New Model of Partnership for the 
Strengthening of Sustainable Development and Integration” where Turkey was 
represented by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 85. A third summit is planned to be 
held in 2019. As a result of these summits there is also an increase on African 
countries’ attraction to Turkey. The number of African countries that have embassies 
in Ankara increased from 10 to 31 over the last 5 years.86 
While Ankara’s aid towards Africa helps to increase its hard power capacity by 
yielding benefits in the economic field, its involvement in Palestine increases its soft 
power. Turkey has little to gain from Palestine in economic terms; in the current 
situation it is unlikely that Palestine will ever have a functioning economy. However, 
Turkey’s support to Palestine helps its soft power building via supporting its reputation 
in the Arab and Muslim world. Erdoğan’s criticism of Israeli attritions towards 
Palestine87, Turkey’s insistence on the lifting of Israeli embargo towards Gaza and the 
Mavi Marmara incident made Turkey the vanguard against Israeli atrocities in 
Palestine. During his visits to Tunisia and Egypt large crowds cheered for him as if he 
was doing a local meeting in Turkey.88 Even though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu apologized for the Mavi Marmara incident 3 years later in 2013, the 
Turkish-Israeli relations are still strained and the previous military cooperation did not 
restart. Turkey is one of the few countries in the world to strongly and openly condemn 
Israel89, even at the cost of diplomatic and military loss. While Turkey increases its 
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outlook in the Muslim world by supporting Palestine, it also faces to lose ground in 
the West. As Turkey is criticizing Israel for its “genocidal actions” towards 
Palestinians in Israel, Israeli officials also criticize Turkey for being anti-Semitist and 
a bully. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman commented on 14 January 2015, 
“Civilized, politically correct Europe’s silence over an anti-Semitic neighborhood 
bully like Erdoğan and his gang takes us back to the 1930s.”90 As can be seen, 
Liberman is using the soft spot of Europe, the guilt for pre-Second World War silence 
over the Nazi attritions towards the Jews. While Ankara is gaining support in one part 
of the world, it is losing on the other part. Also, Turkey stopped its military partnership 
with Israel, both purchases and cooperation.91 This move severely hampered Turkey’s 
military purchases and upgrade plans, yet also proved to be a catalyzer for the domestic 
production, which will further help Turkey’s regional power bid. However how much 
of this strain will affect Turkey is still not visible. For Turkey’s regional power policy 
it is more important to improve relations with its Arab neighbors and to achieve this a 
little deterioration of relations with the West can be regarded as an acceptable loss. 
While Ankara explains its interest in the aid operations as humanitarian interest, 
Tokyo gives an honest and straight explanation to its aid operations. The Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs states two main reasons for Japanese ODA; first, “Japan 
can only ensure its security and prosperity only in a peaceful and stable world. One of 
the most appropriate means for Japan to contribute to peace and stability of the world 
is assistance to developing countries.” And second, “Japan is closely interdependent 
with developing countries since it is able to secure natural resources only through trade 
with those countries. Therefore, it is essential to maintain friendly relations with 
developing countries for Japan’s economic growth.”92 As can be seen, for Tokyo the 
aid is a tool for both maintaining friendly relations to have access to resources and 
markets and to some extent create a stable political sphere, which will benefit the 
security of Japan. 
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While Turkey mainly gives aids in forms of grants and technical assistance, 
Japan gives both loans and grants. Loans can be considered as both aid and not. 
However, what makes it possible to count Japanese loans as aid is Japan’s ability to 
differentiate between its donees. The distribution of the Japanese grants and loans 
shows the mentality and ability to differentiate; while more than 90% of the ODA that 
is given to economically develop Asian and European countries are loans, half of the 
ODA that was given to Africa is made up by grants.93 Tokyo is not using the aid 
process to take advantage of the donees, but since Tokyo also invests in developed 
countries it needs to differentiate between countries. The categorization of which 
country will receive aids in terms of grants or loans is done according to their GNP.94 
Similar to Turkey’s aid policy which helps Turkey’s hard power via economic 
gains, Japan’s aid policy helps Japan’s hard power via helping its security issues. Apart 
from economic reasons that are stated officially, Japan’s aid policy helps its security 
via establishing a stable environment for Japan and supplementing its security policy 
against Chinese encroachment. Japan’s foreign aid is a tool to contain and retain China 
in its near vicinity. Even though Japan does not have hostile relations with China, the 
Japanese bid to become a regional power again is a question of competition against 
China. Every move China makes in the South and South East Asia is against the 
interests of Japan. For this containment policy Japan has to out-move China in the 
region. Weak countries in the region are prone to Chinese capital and investment, 
which would result in closer ties with China and ultimately hurt Japanese interest, like 
Chinese-Burmese relations during the military rule in Myanmar when Japan did not 
have any foothold in Myanmar. When we look at the JICA grants and loans we will 
see that the two regions have the highest priority; South and South East Asia, and after 
them two regions have medium importance; Africa and Middle East. When we look to 
the importance of those regions we will see that South and South East Asia contain 
possible future allies against China, if Japan plays its card carefully. Africa and Middle 
East contain the necessary resources that are needed for the Japanese economy. 
Countries in the South East Asia have material and human resources but need 
capital investment for their development. If Japan does not offer this investment, 
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countries may turn for Chinese assistance, which will in turn increase the Chinese 
influence in the region. Chinese interest in the region can be seen from recently 
founded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was founded as a rival for 
Japanese dominated Asian Development Bank. So therefore Japan needs to offer 
necessary loans and grants to stop China gaining power in the region. To this end Japan 
invested nearly $3.6 billion in South East Asia in 2014, most of which went to Vietnam 
and Indonesia. Vietnam received $1.6 billion and Indonesia $721 million from 
Japanese ODA in 2014.95 
Vietnam and Indonesia are important for the Japanese foreign policy towards the 
region because of several reasons. Vietnam is the second biggest economy after 
Thailand in Indochina and has a big population, which can be a production base for 
Japanese firms. More importantly, Vietnam used to be a Chinese ally during the 
Vietnam War and after its initial independence, but since then their relations 
deteriorated. Especially after the Chinese claims on Spartley Islands in South China 
Sea which are also claimed by Vietnam, Vietnam can prove to be an ally to Japan 
against China. So if Japan can fill the gap opened by Chinese departure, it can gain a 
valuable partner, which can transform into a future ally with a stable market and 
industrial base for Japan with its 90 million population.96 Indonesia, has great capacity 
for exporting the natural resources that Japan industry badly needs and has a very big 
population, over 250 million. Also both Indonesia and Vietnam showed high GDP 
growth rates in recent years. Since 2000, Vietnam increased its GDP from $33.6 billion 
to $186.2 billion in 2014, and Indonesia increased its GDP from $165 billion in 2000 
to $888.5 billion in 2014.97  
India with its large population, natural resources, stable market economy, 
strategic location and democratic structure is a valuable ally for Japan.98 Japan invested 
$2.5 billion in South Asia in 2014, which nearly $1.4 billion of it went to India.99 India 
is one of the few countries, which can compete with Chinese industry and military 
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buildup in the region, and previously had two huge border clashes with China in the 
post-war period, which may have been counted as wars. 
After South and South East Asia, Middle East and Africa gets the medium 
interest in the Japanese investments. Africa received $1.1 billion from the JIKA in 
2014, most of which went to East Africa and Horn of Africa regions.100 Africa has 
been lately targeted by Chinese investments and to counter this Japan intensified its 
investments in the region. The priority of East Africa comes from the stability and the 
strategic importance of the east coast. During the same period countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa received $1 billion investment, and nearly 55% of that went to 
Iraq for the reconstruction of infrastructure. Middle East and North Africa are very 
important and vital for both China and Japan for their oil and natural gas purchases. 
Therefore, it is very important for Japan to have friendly relations with the region for 
the continuation of resource access. 
For both Turkey and Japan, aid is an important tool. To both countries aid is 
crucial to supplement their non-aggressive image. While for Ankara aid is a tool to 
both improve its economy and further enhance its soft power, for Tokyo it helps solve 
its security problems without military means. In the current political atmosphere 
economy and diplomacy are among the key elements in the process of becoming a 
regional power. Both Japan and Turkey need economic and diplomatic power. Japan 
may be among the world’s biggest and most advanced economies, yet it is stagnated 
at the best and declining in the worst view. So new markets are important for Japan for 
two reasons; first, to improve its stagnated economy, and second, to close those 
markets to possible rivals. Also, Japan needs countries with strong developed 
economies as possible future allies. Turkey’s situation is very much same yet very 
different at the same time. Turkey does not have the necessary capital investment 
capacity to use its benign image as of today. Yet it is an investment for the future of 
Turkish economy, which needs markets to expand. It is possible, and highly likely, for 
Turkish capital to be invested in other countries in a greater amount in near future. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FREEDOM AND PROGRES: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
AS FOREING POLICY TOOL 
 
3.1. Democracy Promotion as a Foreign Policy Tool 
As stated in the introduction, in the bid for becoming a regional power the 
claimant country’s resources are important. However, how it is perceived by others is 
as much important as its economic and military capacity. If the claimant cannot 
produce a preferable alternative to the current regional power or its rivals, its influence 
in the region will be limited. Because of this, both Turkey and Japan are trying to 
present themselves as preferable alternatives to the countries in their region than their 
rival claimants and the current regional power. While doing this they need to take 
several things into consideration; their current structure, regional countries’ needs, 
historical elements and etc. To this end, both Turkey and Japan are focusing on two 
things in this policy; freedom and prosperity.  
In a region surrounded by authoritarian regimes, countries may struggle to 
continue their democratic structure. In the past, several countries were swayed to more 
authoritative policies by external and internal problems, and some others needed 
external help to protect their democratic structure. In the inter-bellum period Spain 
suffered a civil war that started in 1936, as an internal conflict, but soon external 
powers such as Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union were actively involved to export 
their ideologies, supporting opposing sides of the conflict. During the Cold War in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary authoritarian regimes were put in power under heavy 
pressure, and direct military involvement of the Soviet Union. Also, in the same 
period, Turkey and Greece were under internal and external pressure in which Greece 
experienced a bloody civil war. Both countries resisted pressure with the aid they got 
from the USA under the Truman Doctrine. 
In such contested environments, countries that are trying to become a regional 
power need to promote themselves as preferable choices to more authoritative 
alternatives. Turkey is promoting itself as a successful democratic country in the 
Muslim world, which also has a developing economy. In the politically authoritative 
and economically backward environment of the Middle East, Turkey is an alternative 
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to Europe for the disillusioned young people, and is easier to reach. Japan likewise is 
surrounded by authoritative regimes like China and Russia. Promoting itself as a 
politically democratic and economically developed country is and instrumental part of 
Japanese foreign policy. Japan has to promote a preferable alternative to China’s 
economic might. It can be claimed that Chinese economic and political model can be 
tempting for the regional countries that are suffering both from social and economic 
problems, therefore Japan needs to show it has an alternative model to Chinese one, 
which manifested itself in Japanese ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ policy. 
Another reason for Turkey and Japan’s democratic and economic role modelling 
is their historical heritage. Both countries have “imperial heritage”. Having histories 
as empires is both a blessing and a curse. Countries that have “imperial legacy” may 
benefit from historical power-base in their ex-subjects and enjoy “privileged role” in 
those areas or they may have strained relations with their ex-subjects due to past 
actions. For example, Russia enjoys a “privileged role” in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus101 due to its cultural and economic power, yet it has strained relations with 
the Baltic States102, Hungary103 and Czech Republic104 due to its actions during the 
Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The United Kingdom on the other hand, kept its influence 
in most of its ex-subjects via its Commonwealth of Nations.105 
Like most of the Asian countries both Turkey and Japan have imperial history, 
yet unlike most of the other Asian countries, both countries’ imperial history continued 
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until the 20th century. Turkey was founded on the last remnants of the Ottoman Empire 
after the catastrophic First World War. The last years of the Ottoman Empire were 
marked with internal turmoil, constant wars and land loses which resulted in 
migrations and massacres. In the Balkans under nationalist history building, the 
Ottoman Empire is portrayed as an oppressive regime that suppressed the national 
identities of the region. In its Arab ex-subjects, it is blamed for the regions 
backwardness. For this reasons, Turkey’s imperial history can create prejudices 
against Turkey’s policies in the region. However, this is not the whole picture. In some 
parts of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire has a positive image, like in Kosovo, Bosnia 
and to some extent in Macedonia. Therefore, Turkey may benefit from the Ottoman 
Empire’s positive image as much as it suffers from its negative image. 
Japan on the other hand, has a different imperial history. For much of its history 
Japan was a feudal agricultural country, which changed in a short time in the late 19th 
century. Over a few decades Japan turned into a Westernized country with a highly 
centralized government and strong industry that badly needed natural resources. To 
obtain these resources Japan had several wars with China and Russia, and then joined 
the Second World War with a surprise attack on the Allies in December 1941. The 
Japanese quickly seized modern day Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Indochina and 
Myanmar. However, Japanese rule was too harsh, in some cases harsher than the 
European colonial rule and was followed by executions, rape and extortions of local 
people. These policies created a horrific image of Japan, which until this day continues 
via issues like “comfort women”, and creates an obstacle in front of Japanese openings 
in the region. 
To counter the negative effects of their imperial legacy and to promote a good 
alternative to the authoritarian regimes, both Turkey and Japan are following a more 
democracy promoting and economic progress oriented promotion campaign. Both 
Ankara and Tokyo are situated in regions where countries may look over the human 
rights issues in order to achieve economic growth. Vietnam, one of the biggest growing 
economies in South East Asia is a one-party regime, Thailand is riddled with 
corruption and coups, all of the Gulf countries are monarchies etc. Japan may promote 
itself as an example for the blending of freedom and progress, where the state does not 
get a draconian stance against its own people to obtain that progress. Japan is a good 
example of personal and political liberties going together with a developed free market 
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economy. In an environment like East and South East Asia, Japan can promote a highly 
appealing alternative to more authoritarian systems.  
Turkey is one of the few countries in the Islamic world that has a continuing 
democratic history, albeit it was interrupted by some coups for short times but 
nevertheless continued. In the Middle East, Turkey is one of the few countries that 
have a working democracy. Most of the Arab states directly started with monarchies 
after their independence, which were gradually replaced with authoritarian monarch-
like dictators who came to power via coups. An article by the Economist on 5 July 
2014 only counts Tunisia as a democracy, Lebanon as semi-democracy and the rest of 
the Arab states in the Middle East ranges between “democratic-facade” and “absolute 
monarchy”.106 In economic terms, Turkey successfully adopted the free market 
economy and improved economic relations worldwide. Especially, Turkey’s rising 
economic profile, since 2002, helped Turkey promote an alternative to the west, for 
the Muslim world. In an environment where most of the nearby nations suffer from 
undemocratic and economically incapable countries, Turkey can try to become a role 
model for Arab states with its working democracy, Euro-Atlantic organizations based 
stance and developing economy it has the potential to become a new “American 
Dream” for the disillusioned Arab people which is easier to reach then Europe or the 
US. 
3.2. Turkey: Democracy in Middle East 
Since the establishment of the republic, Turkish foreign policy has been based 
on two things, status quo and security. This resulted with Turkish foreign policy being 
based on realism rather than idealism. Until the end of the Cold War, Turkey was 
reluctant to condemn human rights issues and stayed out of other countries problems, 
as Ankara perceived them as internal issues. However, in the last two decades Turkish 
foreign policy turned in to a value-oriented diplomacy, at least regarding some 
countries, as was seen in the cases of Syria, Egypt and Libya.  
Turkish foreign policy was significantly changed since the JDP came to power 
in 2002. Unlike its predecessors, weak coalitional governments of the 1990s, the JDP 
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government tried to be active in Turkey’s vicinity and beyond. Since 2002, Ankara 
showed significant importance to its region, which can be seen from the 
rapprochement with the neighbors under the “zero-problem policy”. Turkey’s focus 
on the region can be read as a desire to solve the problems closer to home so that 
Turkey could focus beyond. For a country with a bid to become a regional power, 
having hostile relations with half of its neighbors was not a good starting position as 
the region, which it tries to be active starts from its neighbors. The best example for 
this zero problem policy was the rapprochement between Turkey and Syria. Turkey 
achieved considerable progress during 2006-2010, but the Arab Spring foiled this 
progress. The Arab Spring and the subsequent disturbances in Libya and Syria changed 
the hopes for a smooth transition and reformation in the region. In 2010 Turkey was 
in a Free Trade Agreement with Syria with a high level of cooperation between states 
and was close to enlarge it to Lebanon and Jordan.107 Yet, with the start of Syrian Civil 
War, all that progress was reversed and in 2011 the relations with the Syrian 
government became non-existent, and Turkey is one of the main supporters of the 
Syrian opposition.108 
Turkey has been one of the main supporters of the post-Arab Spring 
governments in the Middle East.109 Ankara supports Tunisia110 and Morocco111 with 
their reformation process, supported Morsi government in Egypt, and in general 
increased its help towards post-Arab Spring governments for economic restructuring. 
Turkey continued its support to Morsi even after he was ousted by coup, and all the 
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other countries recognized Sisi government that came with the coup.112 Ankara sees 
the protests and post-Arab Spring governments as “the legitimate response of the 
people” and supports the people’s demand.113 Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
claiming Turkey’s foreign policy is totally value-oriented would be a bit exaggeration. 
Turkey may speak against Israel on behalf of Palestine or to Sisi government on the 
behalf of Morsi, but Turkey herself keeps dealing with regimes that are not totally 
democratic. Turkey did not make any objections against suppression of the Shia 
majority in Bahrain114, or the opposition against the Saudi regime115, and both 
countries show no desire to reform. Also, Turkey’s increasing relations with Iran116, 
which is accused for oppressing its opposition, or Turkey’s amicable relations with 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir117, who is accused with war crimes, can be seen 
contradictory to value-oriented diplomacy. Furthermore Turkey has never made any 
objections towards some of the Central Asian countries, despite their lack of 
democracy. 
Turkey has a fairly democratic structure, which is run by electorally chosen 
civilian politicians, a developing economy, respects personal freedoms, and has not 
suffered any foreign intervention or war since its independence. Turkey is among a 
few countries in the Middle East, which has democratic regime, where governments 
come and go with elections, with the latter being a stronger sign of democracy than the 
first. In some of the Middle East countries, which are rich on natural resources, 
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governments or monarchies subsidize people’s political reformation desire with 
economic gains, however in other countries people who are crushed under economic 
problems are often looking for economic and political reformation. If Turkey can 
promote itself as a model, both to states and people, it can increase its popularity and 
power in the region. To promote itself as a preferable model Turkey has to put 
emphasis to its stronger points, democracy and economy, which are badly needed by 
governments that wants to reform and sooth any possible uprisings, or post-Arab 
Spring governments that needs to find a way to solve the problems that they rose 
against in the first place. 
Previously, Turkey as a model, was discussed openly in Tunisia by Mohammad 
Ghannouchi and his Ennahda Party118 and to some extent in Egypt by Mohammad 
Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood.119 When Erdoğan visited Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia thousands had gathered to cheer for him, as if he were a politician from their 
own country.120 However, the ongoing civil war in Syria where Ankara openly sides 
with the opposition, and again Ankara’s open criticism towards the coup against Morsi 
and interference to Egyptian internal affairs raises questions among regional countries 
on whether Turkey will become a role model and ally, or just another power interfering 
with local politics. 
3.2.1. Syria and Egypt: Collapse of reformation 
Turkey’s first achievement in its “zero problem” policy was with Syria.121 Syria 
has been a long-term regional enemy of Turkey, with two countries hostile relations 
often going close to declaration of war. Since the Ba’athist coup of 1963, Syria has 
been close to the Eastern Bloc in the Cold War. This brought the country at odds with 
Turkey, who was in the Western Bloc. For years Turkey and Syria had quarrels over 
several reasons, such as Syria’s support for the Partiya Kakeran Kurdistan (PKK)122, 
the Turkish dams on the Euphrates River and the flow of water, Turkey’s recognition 
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of Israel and Hatay problem. Because of this problems Turkey and Syria remained 
confrontational towards each other.  
In 2000, there was a leadership change in Syria. When Hafiz Assad died, he left 
his place to his youngest son, Bashar Assad. Bashar Assad was not involved in the 
Syrian politics until 1994 when his elder brother died and Bashar assumed the role of 
heir. His previous non-involvement in the Baath Party’s rule created hope for 
reformation. Bashar’s early years proposed a hope for reformation in the Syria’s 
authoritarian regime. Bashar released political prisoners, who were mainly Muslim 
Brotherhood members who have been imprisoned by his father, and started a 
crackdown on corruption. However, when the opposition requested a quicker 
reformation and transition he started a crackdown, and arrested some of the opposition 
members. 
With Bashar’s ascension to power, there was a detente between Turkey and 
Syria. Bashar Assad responded positively to a rapprochement. Bashar visited Turkey 
in 2004, the first of its kind in 57 years.123 Syria under Bashar fought with PKK, 
renounced its irredentist claims on Hatay and promised to further improve relations.124 
Ankara responded to this with a range of high profile visits, by Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül in 2003, by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2005, and by Prime 
Minister Erdoğan in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010.125 Syria was one of the neighbors 
with which Turkey had serious problems, so moves were made to ease the problems 
between two countries. Between 2002 and 2010 Turkish-Syrian border was cleared of 
mines, visa exemption was implemented, a free trade agreement was concluded, and 
two states started a high level cooperation. With the Free Trade agreement that came 
to force on 1 January 2007, the trade level between both countries increased. From 
2007 to 2010, the trade volume tripled over three years.126 During Bashar’s visit to 
Turkey it was decided to start High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in September 
2009. In October 2009 two meetings of this council were held in Gaziantep, Turkey 
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and in Aleppo, Syria, with the participation of over ten ministers. The ministerial-level 
meetings were followed by a meeting between prime ministers in December 2009.127 
The High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established in the same year.128 
Furthermore, Quadripartite High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established 
among Syria, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan with the aim of creating a free-trade zone 
between Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.129 
Starting from 2006, Syria experienced rising discontent, which was fuelled by 
economic problems caused by drought. In 2011 Syrian government reacted to the 
discontent brutally, by firing upon protesters, and what started as small economic 
protests soon turned in to an all-out civil war. At first the civil war was a two sided 
conflict between the government troops and the Free Syrian Army, which was backed 
by Sunni regional countries and some Western powers. After both sides failed to 
achieve a quick decisive victory, it turned into a fractured civil war, with dozens of 
competing groups. This virtually ended the Syrian state as an actor and gave way to 
dozens of new non-state actors who controlled some areas and acted as de facto 
countries, in a sense, which resembled the Chinese Warlord Period during the 1920s 
and 1930s. 
Turkey openly backed the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian government, 
basing it as the people’s struggle against tyranny. Since the start of the war Ankara 
opened its borders to refugees, but also trained and equipped the Syrian opposition 
against Damascus.130 Turkey gave support at the expense of its relations with the 
immediate area. Turkey’s support not only cut its relations with Syria but also strained 
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its relations with Russia131 and Iran132, the main powers that are still supporting the 
Syrian government.  
Egypt has similar but very different political history than Syria. In 1952, in a 
bloodless coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muhammad Naguib became the leaders of 
Egypt. After Nasser became the sole leader of the Egypt, Cairo tried to become the 
leader of the Arab world, and for some time Egypt became the leader of the Arab 
struggle against Israel. Egypt was drawn to the Soviet bloc due to the Western support 
to Israel, but it was not a complete a member of the bloc and started the Non-Aligned 
movement with India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. After the 1956 Coup, Turkey’s 
relations with Egypt were sour, due to Turkey’s problems with Syria. Egypt formed a 
short-term union with Syria between 1958 and 1961. Even though their union was 
futile, the Pan-Arabic sentiment in both countries prevailed. Furthermore, the fact that 
Turkey heavily entrenched itself in the Western bloc was another factor that stalled 
any improvement in relations. While Egypt was pitting the West and the Soviets to 
maximize its advantage while staying unaligned, Turkey joined to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) upon its own request. Both during the Nasser and after, 
Egypt was ruled under an authoritarian regime by the military. After the death of 
Nasser, Anwar Sadat replaced him as the president. Sadat’s rule was marked by the 
growing tension between the Islamists in Egypt and the military government. As a 
result of this conflict Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and his successor Hosni Mubarak 
had a heavy crackdown Islamic movements. Until 2011 Egypt was ruled by Mubarak, 
with the backing of the army. 
In 2011 Mubarak was ousted from power as a result of the mass protests in 
Egypt.133 The army saw that a clash was inevitable if it sided with Mubarak, avoided 
confronting the protesters directly, and followed a more cautious approach that 
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resulted with Mubarak’s step down.134 After some time, Egypt went to elections and 
new blocks emerged in Egyptian politics. Muslim Brotherhood, liberals, westerners 
and small Islamic parties entered the parliament.135 However, no side gained majority 
in the elections and soon the democratic process was stalled by the disagreements. 
These disagreements reached peak during the presidential elections, when the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammad Morsi and opposition’s candidate Ahmet Shafiq 
were left as the last candidates.136 Mohammad Morsi was elected as president with 
very small margin. Morsi’s presidency was marked with growing tension between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition.137 While the Muslim Brotherhood’s support 
base wanted more Islamic policies, the opposition feared the country would eventually 
become an Islamic republic. After a very short period, Morsi enacted laws that 
enlarged the powers of the President, which he claimed was necessary to remove pre-
Arab Spring structures from the state organization, however opposition perceived this 
move as enhancing his powers to pave way to an Islamic republic.138 Opposition 
started mass protests against Morsi government, where clashes occurred between anti-
Muslim Brotherhood protesters and pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters. On 1 June 
2013, the Egyptian Army issued a 48 hours ultimatum to Morsi asking to either 
respond to the demands of the protesters or they would intervene, and when their 
ultimatum was not accepted, the Army launched a new coup and removed Morsi and 
his cabinet from power.139 Here it should be explored how Turkey reacted to these 
events and how they shaped its relations in the region. 
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During the Morsi government, Turkey supported Egypt in various fields. 
Economic support was offered to compensate Egypt’s economic loss that occurred 
during and after the protests.140 Ankara also made remarks regarding the constitution 
writing process, and offered help during the constitution writing process giving 
Turkey’s own process as an example. Turkey offered a more moderate constitution to 
alleviate both sides, during his North Africa tour Erdoğan said “Don’t be afraid of 
secularism, prepare your constitution on the basis of secularism”.141 Turkey looked to 
Egypt as a potential example, from which other Arab countries may take influence. 
This should not be read as a one-sided interest, as Morsi’s government was interested 
in Turkey as a role model as well. During his visit to Turkey in September 2012, Morsi 
attended the JDP congress and claimed Turkey’s democratic tradition was a “source 
of inspiration for the Middle East” showing Turkey’s importance as the first 
democratic country in the Middle East and the Islamic world. At the same congress he 
said Turkey’s involvement was needed for “economic and social rehabilitation 
following the Arab Spring revolutions” again showing the need for Turkish economic 
assistance and help for social policies.142 
When the coup happened, Turkey’s reaction to the coup was negative, unlike 
some regional countries.143 The Muslim Brotherhood is influential in a number of 
regional countries, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries, and their ascension 
to power had been foreseen by these countries as a threat to their political structure. 
Therefore, most of the Arab countries, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, were in favor of 
the coup to prevent the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in their own domestic political 
structure. In my opinion, the reaction of the JDP against the coup was influenced by 
its adherence to the concept of ‘national will’. As a political party claiming to represent 
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‘the long suppressed will of the silent Turkish majority’ against the elitist secular 
establishment in Turkey, the JDP naturally sympathized with the Muslim brotherhood 
in Egypt. Fearing that the coup may trigger additional coups in the post- Arab Spring 
countries the JDP firmly opposed the Sisi government. Turkey did not recognize the 
Sisi’s government and considered it illegitimate.144 Turkey expressed this in 
international platforms, openly called other countries to not recognize the coup and 
put pressure on the army, and criticized the Western double standards for recognizing 
and legitimizing a coup.145 Turkey’s continuing support to the Muslim Brotherhood 
severed the relations between Cairo and Ankara. As a response to Ankara’s moves and 
calls against it, Cairo in turn did not support Ankara’s candidacy to obtain a seat in the 
UN Security Council. As of June 2015 Turkish-Egyptian relations have been sour and 
Turkey is one of the last stronghold countries where the Muslim Brotherhood can 
openly continue its activities, since it was banned and designated as terrorist 
organization in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where the movement was 
active previously.146 However, major regional countries, like Saudi Arabia and United 
Arab Emirates, supported the post-coup military supported regime and Turkey was left 
alone in its refusal to acknowledge the post-coup government.147 Furthermore, the use 
of this situation in Turkey’s domestic politics created doubt regarding Turkey’s 
sincerity on the topic. With the recognition of the new Egyptian government by other 
countries, Turkey is left with the image of a country, which is interfering in another 
country’s domestic problems. 
Syria and Egypt are two deadlocks of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. In 
Syria what could have been a successful reformation process was turned into a civil 
war, which contains ethnic and religious cleansing, created non-state actors as players, 
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and started a wave of immigration, which caused instability and socio-economic 
problems in neighboring countries as well as in the EU. Turkey’s unquestioned support 
to the opposition can be related to the previous actions of the Syrian military elite. The 
brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s by the government 
raised concerns in Turkey regarding another crackdown on the opposition. When the 
Syrian government did not stop its heavy-handed approach, Turkey cut its relations 
with the Syrian government and started giving assistance to the Syrian opposition. 
While Turkey still legitimizes its position in Syria as support against a tyrant, the 
waging war crosses the lines regarding who is a tyrant and who is not. The Free Syrian 
Army and other opposition groups that are fighting against the Syrian government also 
started to commit war crimes according to the Human Rights Watch.148  
In Egypt, Ankara may justify its opposition by claiming the coup is anti-
democratic. However Ankara’s solitary opposition leaves it as the only country that is 
still interfering with Egyptian internal politics. Especially after the elections, which 
were boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood, where Sisi garnered popular support for 
the new constitution his government prepared149, the post-coup government represents 
the legitimate government, despite the way it first came into power. 
Both of these policies damaged Turkey’s reputation in the region. Turkey was 
seen as a mediating power among the regional countries, the one that can be trusted 
for inter-state problems, as seen in Syrian-Israeli talks. Since Turkey’s interference in 
the Syrian Civil War and Egyptian politics, Turkey stands as “just another external 
power” that is interfering with the region’s domestic problems. 
3.2.2. Tunisia: Success of the Arab Spring 
The only successful and lasting change that was achieved during the Arab Spring 
so far has been in Tunisia. After its independence from France, Tunisia had been ruled 
by two authoritarian leaders, first by Habib Bourguiba between 1956 and 1987 and 
later by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali between 1987 and 2011. Both leaders’ reign were 
marked by widespread corruption, lack of personal freedoms, censorship, arbitrary 
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jurisdiction, and oppression of opposition.150 Under Ben Ali’s presidency strictly 
“secular” policies were implemented, which often resulted in the oppression of Islamic 
symbols from the social life, such as the headscarf ban, which was implemented on 
educational and government institutions in 2006, like the one that happened in 
Turkey.151 Yet, again like Syria the protests started against the economic problems 
rather than socio-politic oppression. On 17 December 2010 a street vendor, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, immolated himself after police confiscated his goods and insulted him, and 
later municipality officials refused to grant him an audience. His self-immolation 
started a wave of protests, which were crushed heavily by the security forces. 
However, when Bouazizi died in the hospital on 4 January 2011, and the protests 
started again152, this time they became wider as the security forces used force to 
disperse them. Several people committed suicide during the protests, while there were 
causalities resulting from police violence. Within weeks Ben Ali fled the country and 
a new government was announced, however this did not stop the protests as the new 
government also included members of Ben Ali’s party. Facing protests, the new 
government also collapsed and an interim government came into power.153 Following 
the elections of 23 October 2011 Ennahda, an Islamist-conservative party, became the 
greatest party. Ennahda did not pursuit to implement its policies alone, and rather 
formed a coalition with other two runner-up parties Congress for the Republic and 
Ettakatol.154 Ennahda agreed to a coalition government with its rivals in 2015.155 
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Ennahda’s compromising nature was a big contributor for post-Arab Spring 
governments’ success in Tunisia.156 
After Ennahda came into power, there were critics of Ennahda that feared 
Ennahda’s Islamist roots, and a potential move to make Tunisia an Islamic republic. 
However, Ennahda’s leaders gave speeches assuring the public that they did not have 
any ‘Islamic’ agenda like Salafi or Wahhabi Arab states, but they wanted a ‘moderate’ 
view like in Turkey. Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder of Ennahda, said “Why are we 
put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban and the 
Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like 
the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models; models that combine Islam and 
modernity?”157 As can be seen Turkey created the intended effect on the Tunisia; 
promoted itself as an acceptable alternative over more authoritarian rivals, like Saudi 
Arabia, with its blending of Islam, modernity and liberty rather than subsidizing the 
discontent. 
3.3. Japan: Peace, Security and Prosperity 
Until the end of the 1990s Japan was technologically the most advanced and 
biggest economy in Asia, and even today it is the top country in some fields. This is a 
result of the Japanese economic restructuring following its destruction after the Second 
World War. Knowing that its meagre resources could not compete with other 
countries, Japan turned from quantity to quality, resulting in mastery on electronics 
and top-end technology. This is an economic model, which many countries have been 
trying to adopt fully or to some extent. Because of this, a number of countries have 
been trying to re-model their economies after the Japanese model and to do so they 
have been increasing their trade relations and cooperation with Japan and inviting 
Japanese firms to learn know-how. Until the change in the Japanese Foreign Policy in 
2000s, this model was the main thing Japan was promoting, however now Japan is also 
focusing on ‘values’ along with ‘prosperity’ in its promotion of itself as a model 
country, like Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. 
Unlike some countries where the foreign policy is marked by powerful political 
figures and remembered after them, Japanese foreign policy is marked by speeches. 
                                                          
 
156 Mustafa Akyol, “Turkey’s Model Nation”, The New York Times, 16 February 2014, accessed on 
10.01.2016, accessed from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/opinion/turkeys-model-nation.html 
157 Atul Aneja, “From Arab Spring to post-Islamist summer”, The Hindu, 12 October 2011. 
   58 
 
While those speeches are usually given by important individuals, policies are called 
after the speeches because even after individuals lose their position, those policies are 
followed. On 24 July 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro gave a speech 
to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, where he marked the importance of 
the old Silk Road countries and Russia for Japan, which subsequently created Japan’s 
“New Silk Road” project and paved way to the intense Japanese involvement in 
Central Asia.158  Another example is Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s speech on 
30 November 2006, which was named “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s 
Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”.159  His speech added “freedom” as a new fragment 
to Japanese foreign policy, and changed its essentials. But it should be noted that this 
trend of the Japanese foreign policy was not solely based on one member of the 
government, but what Aso proposed in his speech was further continued by other 
members in the cabinet, such as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe gave a speech at the 
North Atlantic Council meeting at Brussels on 12 January 2007, where he was the first 
Japanese prime minister to address the NATO. In his speech Abe pointed out the 
common values between Japan and the NATO members, and suggested Japan could 
cooperate with the NATO to promote these ideals.  
Japan and NATO are partners. We have in common such fundamental values as 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is only natural that we 
cooperate in protecting and promoting those values. My government is 
committed to reinforcing the stability and prosperity of the world based on the 
fundamental values I have just mentioned160 
Abe continued the rhetoric, which Aso used a month before and focused, two 
things: values and prosperity. Two weeks later in his speech to the Japanese Diet on 
26 January 2007, Abe promoted a ‘proactive diplomacy’ for Japan, which was new 
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thing for Japan, which has a highly bureaucratic structure and usually has been 
‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive’.161 In his speech Abe stated three pillars; 
a. Strengthening relations with countries that share common values. 
b. Creating an Asia that is prosperous. 
c. Contributing to global peace and stability.162 
Abe later promoted same ideas during his new prime ministership in 2012. The 
emphasis on the common values became an important part of the Japanese foreign 
policy under Shinzo Abe’s administration. In the Diplomatic Bluebook 2014, the keys 
of the Abe’s foreign policy are stated as; 
Since the inauguration of the current administration led by Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe, Japan has pursued a strategic foreign policy that “Takes a 
Panoramic Perspective of the World Map.” Upholding universal values such as 
freedom, democracy, respect of fundamental human rights, and the rule of 
law.163 
3.3.1. The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
In 2006 Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso heralded new dimensions to 
Japanese foreign policy in the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity speech. First, Japanese 
foreign policy up to this date had not been centered in a value-oriented form, such as 
democracy, freedom or human rights etc. This pragmatism and the lack of value-orient 
was one of the reasons where Japan was criticized in some cases, like its lack of 
condemn to Uzbekistani government after the Andijan events.164The Arc of Freedom 
integrated value-oriented foreign policy to Japanese foreign policy. Second, it brought 
new areas and countries to the attention of Japanese foreign policy.  
First of all there is "value oriented diplomacy," which involves placing emphasis 
on the "universal values" such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of 
law, and the market economy as we advance our diplomatic endeavors. 
And second, there are the successfully budding democracies that line the outer 
rim of the Eurasian continent, forming an arc. Here Japan wants to design an 
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"arc of freedom and prosperity". Indeed, I believe that we must create just such 
an arc.165 
Previously Japan was mainly engaged in its close neighbors, like China and 
South Korea, and the US, which has been its main ally. However, the Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity could not make a significant change due to unexpected failure of the 
Liberal Democrat Part (LDP) in councilor elections in 2007. The LDP government 
was unexpectedly defeated in the elections, which lead to changes in government. Aso 
lost its position to Machimura Nobutaka, who did not follow Aso’s Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity initiative. Then Abe resigned from his post, and his successor Yasuo 
Fukuda had difficulty in running the government because of the political deadlock 
between the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors and resigned from 
his position in favor of Aso, who managed to run the government for another year 
before finally going to early elections in 2009. 2009 Elections proved disastrous for 
the LDP, which became opposition for the second time in the post-war era. The new 
government run by the Democrat Party of Japan (DPJ) focused on domestic politics 
and did not followed the policy that was proposed by Abe and Aso’s foreign policy. 
Yet it should be noted that while the DPJ’s focused on domestic politics, it still 
continued the initiatives started by the LDP even if not expanded them. 
 The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’s value-oriented approach is noteworthy, 
because it brought a new discourse to Japanese foreign policy. Previously Japanese 
foreign policy was based on several pillars, such as access to resources, good relations 
with neighbors, and continuation of alliance with the US for Japan’s security. But this 
policy sometimes created an atmosphere where Japan came to odds with its Western 
allies due to its reluctance at condemning authoritarian regimes. But what was more 
important was that Japan did not propose an only ‘value-oriented’ policy, which would 
create resentment from authoritarian regimes. Japan’s choice to add “prosperity” to its 
new approach makes it easier to promote itself to the regional countries. One of the 
main reasons of the regional countries’ authoritarian policies may be seen as their 
inability to solve their people’s socio-economic demands and therefore the fear against 
rising discontent. When we look at the regions that are surrounding Japan we will see 
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a five-decade long military dictatorship in Myanmar, frequent coups in Thailand, 
authoritarian China, and North Korea and Central Asian countries. Only stable 
democracies in the region are Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea and even they 
suffered military coups and internal problems. In such an environment trying to 
promote values that are ‘alien’ to the region may be a hindrance for Japanese foreign 
policy. Values such as democracy, freedom, and free market economy may seem as 
‘normal’ values for the Western countries and societies, they may even think those 
values as ‘universal’. However, to the strictly ordered community based social climate 
of the Asian people, these Western universal values may be perceived as a threat to 
their stability, especially by their government who will see those values as a means to 
provoke their otherwise docile population. Therefore adding ‘prosperity’ to the 
‘freedom’ makes it more acceptable to Asian nations. 
 Aso’s speech was also an initiative came from the foreign minister rather than 
the ministry. In Japan, ministers usually have served less than one year and acted as 
figure-heads as they did not intervene in to the ministry too much. Instead of ministers, 
bureaucrats ruled ministries. However, Aso was the main driving force behind the Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity. Even before his position as foreign minister, he was 
backing Japan’s interaction in the regions beyond its previous relations. Back in 1997 
when Prime Minister Ryutaro launched Japan’s “New Silk Road” policy, Aso was a 
member of the Hashimoto’s administration as Director General of the Economic 
Planning Agency and immediately visited Central Asia, embracing this new region as 
a necessary geopolitical and economic zone for Japan’s economy and foreign policy.166 
The speech was also important to mark the Abe’s future government and his taking 
the grip in the government and policies. 
 3.3.2 Australia and India 
 For Japan’s value-oriented diplomatic discourse Australia and India keep a 
special place. While most of the regional countries need to first internalize the values, 
and secondly need to develop themselves to become ‘useful’ allies, India and Australia 
are both ready as allies. Both India and Australia are important for Japan’s security 
and promoting the cooperation beyond security dimension. 
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Australia is an ex-colonial subject of the United Kingdom, and a member of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Australia has the 4th strongest economy in the 
Commonwealth, with a GDP of $1.454 trillion, despite its small population.167 
Australia is the best example of having a continuing democracy in the region that 
surrounds Japan. Since it was given status of dominion, Australia maintained a perfect 
record of democratic tradition and did not suffer any coups or inter-party civil 
disturbances. Apart from South African Apartheid like laws against its indigenous 
people that were relinquished in the last few decades, Australia has a near perfect 
history of Western values, such as freedom of press, human rights, rule of law, 
universal suffrage etc. It already shares most of the values that are proposed by the Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity. 
Australian military history started with the First World War, where a great 
number of Australian troops fought in the British armies in many fronts. However, it 
was the Second World War that made Australia realize it needs to have its own military 
capability. Australia was spared from the war during the First World War because of 
its location. The same thing seemed to happen in the Second World War, but the 
Japanese surprise attack on the Allies caught them off-guard. In a few months all the 
British and Dutch colonies fell to the Japanese and Japanese advanced as far as Papua 
New Guinea, which is just across Australia. Australians had to defend themselves from 
the Japanese by themselves before the US accommodated forces to the Pacific theatre. 
This military cooperation later continued to the Cold War era and created a military 
alliance in 1951 as Australia, New Zeeland, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) 
which is still active between the USA and Australia.168 Australian troops participated 
in the Korean War according to the UN resolution. Also, as a part of the ANZUS treaty 
Australia sent troops to Vietnam War, the US Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the 
US Invasion of Iraq in 2003. Australia was the largest non-NATO personal contributor 
to Afghanistan with more than twenty six thousand soldiers.169 
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Unlike many other nations in the region, Japan’s imperialistic ambitions prior 
and during the Second World War did not leave permanent infamy on the Australian 
public opinion. This was due to Japanese forces could not reach mainland Australia; 
therefore their hostilities were mainly on the front. Because of this, Japan does not 
have the negative impressions it has on other countries, like China or South Korea. 
Therefore a partnership between Japan and Australia is easier to achieve than with 
some other countries. The partnership between Australia and Japan came to formality 
on 1 May 2002 during Prime Minister Koizumi government called Australian-
Japanese Creative Partnership.170 One of the main points of this agreement that needs 
to be highlighted is the stress to regional cooperation: 
Drawing on their strong record of cooperation in APEC, the East Asian financial 
crisis, the ASEAN Regional Forum, peacekeeping in Cambodia and now in East 
Timor, both leaders affirmed their renewed commitment to work together to 
meet regional challenges.171 
Both countries look to one another as a partner to answer ‘regional challenges’ 
which are the instability, human trafficking, money laundering and countries that are 
threatening regional countries. But another important dimension of this agreement is 
that it is not solely on regional level, bur further includes areas like the UN. Australia 
agreed to support Japan for its bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council. To further stabilize a bilateral partnership Australia and Japan signed Japan-
Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation on 13 March 2007.172 This 
declaration was signed on Shinzo Abe’s first term as prime minister, who comes from 
the same faction of the LDP with Koizumi and lead that faction after him. The Security 
Cooperation Agreement further promised to increase a defensive cooperation between 
two countries regarding many fields, and most importantly, maritime and aviation 
security where regional countries are increasingly pressured by China. The most 
important aspect of these agreements was that Australia is the second nation Japan has 
concluded any bilateral military cooperation agreement since the end of the Second 
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World War, after Japans traditional ally and security provider the US. After decades 
of relying on one main ally, Japan is trying to diverse its security partners. As for 
Australia, like Japan, the US is its main military ally. So when Japan and Australia 
started increasing their security cooperation with each other, it easily turned into a 
trilateral cooperation. On 18 May 2006, a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was launched 
among the US, Australia, and Japan. Although the US and Australia do not want this 
agreements to be “anti-Chinese”, the rising suspicion and fear towards Chinese 
military build-up and territorial claims against most of its neighbors will certainly 
bring the agreement towards that point eventually.173 The agreement includes “a wide 
range of current security challenges, both regional and global, of shared interest to our 
three Governments. Supporting the emergence and consolidation of democracies and 
strengthening cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region”174 and currently the 
biggest revisionist country in the Asia-Pacific region is China.  
India has the biggest democracy in the world, and has problems with income 
inequality and poverty, but has great economic potential with its resources and 
population. Japan approached India as a strategic partner for its proactive diplomacy 
as India would fit into both parts of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.175 In early 
2007 a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was launched among Japan, India, the US and 
Australia but later did not develop much further than an initial declaration. In 2007, 
during his visit to Japan, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a joint 
statement with Abe and said: 
The two leaders affirm that Japan and India are natural partners as the largest 
and most developed democracies of Asia, with a mutual stake in each other's 
progress and prosperity. Indeed, a strong, prosperous and dynamic India is in the 
interest of Japan, and likewise, a strong, prosperous and dynamic Japan is in the 
interest of India.176 
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After Singh’s visit to Japan, Abe paid a visit to India in return between August 
21 and 23 in 2007, where he concluded several agreements. Also, Japan for the first 
time joined the Malabar naval military exercises, which are held by India and the US. 
In 2007, Malabar 07-01 exercises were conducted off the coast of Okinawa islands in 
Japan, by a joint fleet from the US, India and Japan.177 Again in 2007 Malabar 07-02 
was exercised with a larger participation in Bay of Bengal by a joint fleet from 
Australia, Singapore, the US, India, and Japan.178 China was greatly disgruntled by the 
two military exercises held in the waters around it but it did not openly criticize them.  
However neither the Indian-Japanese nor the Australian-Japanese strategic 
partnerships yielded the intended results. In 2007 Abe had to resign, which led to 
power struggle inside the LDP and eventually resulted with the LDP’s electoral defeat. 
At the same time in Australia John Howard of the Liberal Party, who favored the 
security cooperation between Japan and Australia, lost elections to Kevin Rudd of the 
Labor Party, who wanted to draw Australia back to domestic issues. A similar change 
happened in Japan where the new DPJ government focused on domestic issues, but 
was reluctant to expand those partnerships beyond the already established extend. 
However, not all of the Japanese efforts on Aso’s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity or 
Abe’s proactive diplomacy were in vain. Even in the DPJ’s domestic oriented 
government, Japan maintained close relations with both India and Australia at the 
ministerial level, if not the desired military level. Annual foreign minister level 
meetings were held between both India and Japan, and Australia and Japan where 
regional, economic, and global problems were discussed. 
Kevin Rudd’s government made a further move and left the Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue. However, this did not mark the end of the security agreements 
between four countries. Rudd later visited India in November 2009 and signed a 
bilateral agreement with India, so all four countries had bilateral agreements with one 
another but the quadrilateral agreement did not fall into action.179 But, since all 
countries shared same suspicion towards China’s revisionist aims in the region, which 
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was suspicion back in 2007, but became a fact in the recent years, there is still a high 
possibility of further cooperation among the four countries. 
3.3.3. Abe’s New Term: Since 2012 
When Abe was re-elected as prime minister on 26 December 2012, it marked a 
return to pro-active foreign policy he tried to follow in 2007. On 27 December 2012, 
just the day after Abe’s election, his new foreign policy was published under the name 
of “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”.180 There, Abe stated his fears, plans and 
hopes for the region and showed what the Japanese foreign policy would be in his new 
term. The main points of Democratic Security Diamond were; expanding and 
redefining the US-Japan security alliance, continuing and expanding the Quadrilateral 
agreement of 2007, re-integrating the United Kingdom and France to the regional 
security, and the containment of Chinese ambitions in the region. 
In his article Abe based Japan’s choices regarding allies on democracy. Thus, 
since 2012 Japan has spent efforts to strengthen her ties with India, Australia and the 
US. Tokyo tried to expand and reinitiate bilateral agreements between Japan-India, 
Japan-Australia, and Japan-US, as well as trilateral and quadrilateral agreements that 
were put in motion in 2007. 
Japan is a mature maritime democracy, and its choice of close partners should 
reflect that fact. I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US 
state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons starching 
from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific. I am prepared to invest, to 
the greatest possible extent, Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond.181 
Since 2012 Japan has been focusing on its relations with Australia.182 Australia 
concluded joint naval drills with Japan and the US in 2015.183 Japan was chosen as 
producer for new submarines for the Australian navy.184 However, although Canberra 
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may feel endangered by Chinese intentions185, it still enjoys trade relations with 
Beijing. This was seen when the initial Australian participation in quadrilateral 
agreement was cancelled by the Labor Party government in 2008.186 Although 
Australia started participating in bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral agreements again, 
any direct or indirect conflict with China may be disastrous for Australian economy.187 
Therefore, it is not clear whether Japan will find the ally it seeks in Australia and if 
Japan hopes to attract Australia to an actual military agreement, it has to offer the 
prosperity mentioned previously.188 
India, on the other hand, became clearer regarding its stance against China, and 
the possibility of alliances with Australia, Japan and the US in Abe’s second term.189 
The rising tension between China and its neighbors or regional countries increased 
Delhi’s fears regarding Beijing’s ambitions. As a country, which suffered from 
Chinese revisionism, India is ready for a security agreement more than Australia. The 
Indian-Japanese relations still continue to expand, from security to economy.190 In 
2014191 and 2015192 Japan rejoined Malabar naval exercises that were held by the US 
and India, which Japan previously joined in Abe’s first term. Especially, the theme of 
the 2015 exercises, hunting submarines, shows these exercises are not about disaster 
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relief but a preparation to a future conflict.193 Given the rise of the number of 
submarines in the Chinese fleet, and the plans to further raise that numbers, it is more 
of a reality than speculation that these exercises aim to prepare the region against the 
Chinese naval expansion. Japan is planning to permanently join those exercises to 
solidify its defense cooperation with India.194 
3.4. Evaluation 
While Turkey and Japan both try to promote themselves as democratic and 
progressive role models,” they both received mixed results. While democracy, 
personal freedoms and free market may be seen as “universal ideals” by the Western 
societies, they may not prove tempting in other regions. In some societies democracy 
may be seen as a destabilizing factor, which brings political uncertainty, personal 
freedoms may be seen as being against the moral codes of the society and the free 
market may be seen as a way to exploit the lower segments of the society. Therefore, 
promoting Western ideals can be a difficult aim to achieve. 
The Japanese democracy promotion discourse focuses on two sets of countries. 
First, the already established democracies of the region, like India and Australia, 
second, the developing democracies of the region, like Indonesia and Vietnam. Japan’s 
preferences, unlike Turkey, are based on more practical reasons. Although using the 
democracy against more authoritarian rivals, Japanese foreign policy is still based on 
real-politik and changes according to the realities of the world. In the decade after the 
end of the Cold War, Japanese focus on Central Asia was based on the hopes of a slow 
but steady transformation of the socio-politic structure of Central Asia and to gain 
necessary resources like natural gas that Japan was in dire need. Because of this, Japan 
did not criticize any of these countries in their slow transformation or lack of 
enthusiasm, and rather focused on economic gains while promoting democracy.195 
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However, when it became clear that a quick transformation in Central Asia was not an 
option, Japan stopped giving priority to the region. 
Since 2001, first under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and later under Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan turned its attention to the areas that are closer, focusing 
on the developed and developing countries in the South Eastern Asia. In South Eastern 
Asia, the presence of Chinese domination and threat is more visible and it is easier and 
more likely for Japan to find allies. Therefore Japan’s focus on the region under the 
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and Democratic Security Diamond can be seen as using 
the democracy promotion and prosperity as a pretext to create containment towards 
the Chinese threat in the region. This containment can be easier to achieve by using 
democracy promotion as a rhetoric in its foreign policy against the Chinese 
authoritarianism and providing an acceptable alternative.  
When Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister for the second time in 2012, he 
renewed his plans to pursue an active foreign policy. This time taking the advantage 
of his growing popularity in the public, and with the increase of the LDP’s electoral 
success, Abe started to pursue his foreign policy, which was cut short in his previous 
government. Abe started to implement what he called the ‘democratic security 
diamond’ that included the regional democratic countries against the undemocratic 
countries. In his second term Abe’s foreign policy became more successful on using 
the democracy promotion because of changes in the regional politics. China’s 
revisionist and expansionist policies became clearer. In Abe’s first term they were 
merely speculations, which were waived as realist paranoia, however in Abe’s second 
term China’s revisionist policies became visible with Chinese massive military build-
up and continuous territorial claims. China became a visible threat to the democracies 
of the region. Japan was successful in democracy promotion discourse became 
successful because the defining core of the policy was not the export of the values or 
the system. Rather than spending effort to export the values, Abe’s tried to improve 
and expand Japan’s foreign policy to the countries that already shared or was ready to 
share those values. As a result of both these reasons, the Chinese actions and Japan’s 
slow pace, Japan was able to create stronger ties with regional countries like India. 
While Tokyo was successful in bringing Australia and India to its side, whether 
the democratic security diamond will be successful is a big question mark. Japan has 
been unable to bring the UK or France in to arena. Furthermore, Japan has to overcome 
its pride and face with its past to bring South Korea into this alliance, if Tokyo really 
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wants to promote an Asian NATO196. South Korea, like Japan, is endangered by both 
North Korea and China and has the closest democracy to Japan. In the current context, 
democracy is only used as a flavor to name the security organization against China.  
Turkey’s democracy promotion on the other hand, was more about exporting 
democracy and the so-called ‘Turkish model’ to the region. During the early years of 
the JDP government Ankara was occupied with the improvement of the Turkish 
economy after the 2001 economic crisis. Because of this, Ankara could not divert its 
attention to value oriented policies and rather focused more on realist policies such as 
improving trade relations. However, as the Turkish economy recovered and the 
regional political structure became ready for this export of values under the Arab 
Spring, the JDP government started to turn its attention to a more value oriented 
foreign policy. Turkey tried to promote democracy, the free market and regional 
cooperation, which would help to start a successful reformation process in the Middle 
East countries. To achieve this Turkey intensified its rapprochement with Syria, 
promised economic aid to Tunisia and Egypt, and implemented several agreements to 
improve regional cooperation. 
When the Arab Spring first started it sent a wave of shock across the Middle 
East. To some countries the news was worrisome, consolidated dictatorships that have 
lasted more than a several decades were ousted in a few weeks. For Turkey, it signaled 
an era of opportunity, where Turkey could improve its relations with the region. As 
much as signaling a chance to improve trade relations, it also enabled Turkey to export 
its model. When the protests achieved their aims in Tunisia and Egypt, a question arose 
about the new government form and which model they could follow. Apart from 
Turkey, the whole Middle East had three ‘functioning’ democracies, Iran, Lebanon 
and Israel. Iran with its limited democracy and highly, if not totally, theocratic 
structure would not be an appealing model to regimes that came after revolutions 
against authoritarian governments. Israel could not be named by any Muslim country 
as role model due to the great amount of resentment from the people. The other half of 
the Middle East countries are either monarchies or dictatorships. Turkey’s peaceful 
relations with the EU, growing economy, and relatively good slate on human rights 
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issues made it an acceptable alternative, which was more preferable than monarchies 
and dictatorships, which troubled the region for too long, and which was the main 
reason behind the Arab Spring. 
When Turkey was openly discussed and pointed to as a model by some 
politicians from Tunisia and Egypt, it created great optimism in Turkey. Turkey did 
not only produce a model in terms of government model but also the JDP was a role 
model on its own. Tunisia and Egypt’s biggest Islamist parties, Ennahda and Muslim 
Brotherhood respectively, took lessons from the JDP’s ascension to power and more 
importantly its consolidation of power. Although the JDP’s ascension to power can be 
based on reasons that are not solely about the party, its power consolidation and the 
continuation of electoral success are mainly a result of party policies. When the JDP 
first came to power in 2002 it did not pursue openly Islamist rhetoric. Rather than 
choosing openly confrontational policies, the JDP respected the red lines of the secular 
state structure, and emphasized the democratization process. By doing so, the JDP 
managed to avoid an open clash with the power structure until it consolidated its 
power. While Ennahda followed a similar approach the Muslim Brotherhood followed 
a more confrontational approach, like the JDP’s predecessor the Welfare Party. 
Similarly while Ennahda managed to stay in power, the Muslim Brotherhood had been 
ousted from the power by a coup, again like the Welfare Party. 
While Japan was able to restructure its discourse and the target countries, Turkey 
stuck to the same countries, which turned them from foreign policy topics to domestic 
policy topics. When faced with difficulties, Japan did not pursue an insisting approach 
and was able to change its attention towards other countries, thus its policies did not 
enter a deadlock and was able to bring more efficient results. However, while Turkey 
was able to get over its differences with Russia, Iran, and pre-Arab Spring Syria, after 
the Arab Spring, it got caught up in Syrian and Egyptian problems. This also affected 
Turkey’s relations with the neighboring countries. Ankara’s insistence in Syria can be 
based on the fact that Turkey and Syria are neighbors, and the amount of violence and 
ethnic cleansing resulting in refuge makes it a domestic issue. Yet, in its response to 
the coup in Egypt, Turkey became a side in Egypt’s domestic politics, and continued 
to be so even after it became clear that there was no change on the horizon. Sisi came 
at power via the coup, and later became elected president via elections. Turkey was 
left as the only country to oppose the coup, which strained Turkey’s relations with 
Egypt and the regional countries. Furthermore, Turkey’s reluctance to condemn some 
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countries, which were also having problems regarding democracy and freedom, like 
Iran or Sudan, strained the credibility of its discourse. 
For both Turkey and Japan, the democracy promotion is an essential part of their 
foreign policy. Turkey’s rivals in the bid to becoming a regional power are countries 
like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Apart from Ankara nearly all the regional countries that 
are in bid for regional power are authoritarian, and the current regional power Russia 
is authoritarian too. Similarly, Japan’s main rival in the region is China has a highly 
authoritarian one-party system. Because of this, both Turkey and Japan need to show 
themselves as preferable alternatives to authoritarian regimes, organize cooperation 
among the democratic countries of their region, and further democratizing more 
countries via peaceful solutions, which will help their competition against 
authoritarian countries in their region. But, while Japan is using this discourse 
pragmatically and reorganized its foreign policy according to the regional changes, 
Turkey got stuck in Egypt and Syria, which tarnished its reputation and discourse. 
Turkey although opposing to the brutal methods of the regime in the Syria, supported 
opposition groups, which fought against the regime with similar methods. In Egypt, 
Turkish stance was seen as a pro-democratic stance against coups from a country that 
also suffered several coups. But as the time passed, Turkey’s pro-Muslim Brotherhood 
stance became a domestic issue in Turkey and interference in to the domestic problems 
of another country. While Japan was successful on using this discourse in its foreign 
policy due to adaptability, Turkey was unable to co-op with the ever-changing political 
environment of the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MILITARY CAPABILITY AND REGIONAL POWERS 
 
4.1. Hard Power and Regional Powers 
While the emphasis has shifted from hard power to soft power in the recent 
decade, the role hard power plays in the international power structure is unarguable. 
Realist theorists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau and John J. Mearsheimer, often place 
hard power, military power to be more precise, at the heart of international politics. 
Mearsheimer defined power mainly as the military because of the realist theory’s great 
emphasis on hard power and stated, “I define power largely in military terms because 
offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ultima ratio of international politics”197 
Although underestimated in recent years, it seems the role of military power will 
not diminish in the international order. While the role of economic power and soft 
power has risen, the military power is still one of the deciding factors in the 
international power structure. Even when the economy of a great power collapses, as 
can be seen in Russia, or starts to decline, as can be seen in the US198, the sheer might 
of its military can still keep it as a great power. Also, the last decade showed that 
without military power to act as persuasion tool, even a small country could threaten 
a larger country. The threat created by North Korea against South Korea and Japan can 
be seen as an example. Although no match to either of these countries in economy or 
human resources, North Korea still is a military threat to the both of them because of 
their weak militaries. 
If the current great powers and regional powers are examined, it can clearly be 
seen that there is still an increase in the overall military spending in most countries. 
India, China, Australia, and Russia increased their military spending, while the US still 
tries to maintain its military leadership even with its declining economy and budget 
deficit. In such an environment for a country trying to become a regional power, the 
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military capacity is as important as its economic and soft power capacity. Without the 
necessary military power to act as protection or deterrence, there is no way a country 
can protect itself. Even though most of the new theories criticize the realist theory’s 
over-emphasis on military power, their emphases on other things such as economic 
interdependency, soft power and etc. do not provide a better focus either.199 The 
economic interdependency was seen and proposed as a tool to prevent future conflicts 
and wars, but the current international situation shows this may not work in reality, as 
it works in theory. Since the 1990s the Japanese and Chinese economies are heavily 
interdependent but the last decade saw extensive Chinese military build-up and 
continuous incursions in Japanese aerial and maritime boundaries. Since 2010, China 
increased its defense budget over 10% each year, and at the end of 2014 had a military 
budget that was five times of Japan’s and four times of India’s.200 The same situation 
is happening between Russia and the European Union. While the European Union is 
relatively dependent on Russia for natural resources, and Russia needs the European 
Union as a big and stable market for its natural resource exports, this does not stop 
Russia from interfering in Ukraine and Georgia despite heavy protests from the 
European Union or from European countries allowing the US to station missile defense 
systems in their lands despite protests from Russia. 
In Japan and Turkey’s bid for regional power, military power constitutes an 
important part. Both countries are in hostile environments. Japan is surrounded by 
countries that are actively hostile towards it. North Korea, despite its small size and 
weak economy, poses a threat to the security of Japan with its missile tests, nuclear 
program, and frequent threats towards Japan and past issues such as the abduction of 
Japanese civilians.201 China is one of the few countries that keep increasing military 
spending consecutively, and its dominating attitude towards its neighbors and 
territorial claims increase the tension in the region. China has claims on the Senkaku 
Islands, which have been under Japanese rule since 1895, and territorial disputes 
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continue with South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and Philippines. China also creates 
artificial islands to act as military bases on the South China Sea, which further 
complicates the already messed up situation.202 Although Russia is not actively hostile 
towards Japan, the two countries have not resolved their problems regarding the 
Russian occupation of Kuril and the Sakhalin islands at the end of the Second World 
War. Furthermore, the recent Russian interventions in Ukraine and Georgia create 
suspicions towards a future Russian revisionism. The friendliest country towards Japan 
in its near vicinity is South Korea, which has bittersweet relations with Japan. Both 
countries face the same problems, a hostile North Korea and revisionist China but this 
does not change the historical issues created by the Japanese occupation of Korea 
between 1910 and 1945. 
Similarly, Turkey is surrounded by a hostile environment. Turkey had 
bittersweet relations with both Greece and Iran, ranging between hostile and friendly. 
On the south, Turkey is neighbor to Syria and Iraq, which both had problems with 
Turkey throughout history. Syria supported the PKK and had territorial claims over 
the Hatay province of Turkey. But what is more worrisome is, as of 2015 there has 
been no functioning central authority in Syria. Syria is divided between groups that 
are fighting against one another and since nearly each group has international support 
from some countries, the situation does not promise a quick end. Iraq had its ups and 
downs in relation to Turkey, and the presence of the PKK camps in Northern Iraq 
further strained the relations. The weakness of the Iraqi and Syrian states also paved 
way to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 203, which made several terrorist 
attacks on Turkey and further aggravates the situation in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s 
relations with Armenia are also problematic due to the 1915 Events and Armenian 
invasion and occupation of Azerbaijan’s Nagorny Karabakh province. In the past there 
were problems with Bulgaria regarding discrimination towards the Turkish population 
living in Bulgaria. But out of all these neighbors, the only neighbor that poses an actual 
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military threat to Turkey is Russia. Russia with its military capacity is the only country 
in the region, which can make an actual difference in regional politics, and the Russian 
interference in Georgia and Ukraine has created tension in the region. But more 
importantly, Turkey faces a threat that Japan does not, a separatist terrorist 
organization. Since the late 1980s Turkey has been facing continuous terrorist attacks 
from the PKK on both its military and civilian targets. The conflict was slowed down 
with the JDP government’s initiatives, but as of end of 2015, the conflict intensified to 
a new scale. 
In facing such threats both Turkey and Japan have two tools: their security 
forces, and their memberships in the international security organizations and bilateral 
alliances. Both Turkey and Japan were in the Western block during the Cold War and 
they still are. Turkey joined the NATO in 1952, and is still a member of it. Turkey 
joined the NATO to have a security umbrella against any possible Soviet offensive. 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has needed the help of NATO 
against possible attacks at its southern border. Also, Ankara is a close ally of 
Washington and provided it with military bases during the Cold War, the Gulf War, 
the US War on Terror, and the latest operations against the ISIL. The US is the closest 
ally and arms provider of Turkey.  
Unlike Turkey, Japan was not a member of any great security organization 
during the Cold War, and was only admitted as strategic partner by the NATO in 2002. 
Japan’s security was mainly based on its alliance with the US. The US has maintained 
over a few dozen military bases and stationed troops in Japan since the Second World 
War. Other than the US, Japan signed bilateral agreements with India and Australia in 
the recent years, as aforementioned, which bore fruit with joint military exercises.  
The greatest difference between Ankara and Tokyo is Tokyo has no ‘army’ since 
the end of the Second World War.204 Japan’s security is provided by the Self-Defense 
Forces (SDF) and the US Forces in Japan205 (USFJ). The SDF is a security force 
between the police forces and the regular army, stronger than the first but weaker than 
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the latter, and even then it was constitutionally unpermitted from acting overseas. As 
I explained before, until the same of the Gulf War, Japan was not fully aware of its 
precarious situation. While there was a desire to change the constitutional restrains, 
this desire was not shared by general public. Japanese public was in favor of “trading 
power” which brought comfort Japanese people without taking any policemen role in 
world. Starting from 1990s Japan changed its military restrains and abilities. In 1993 
Japan send SDF forces to peacekeeping mission to Cambodia under UN resolution, 
and later to other missions. The Japanese Ministry of Defense was officially founded 
in 2007, which was seen as a move to make Japan a normal power. Until 2015, there 
were strong arguments regarding a change in the law that forbids the foundation of a 
regular army and use of force outside of Japan206, and it was only changed at the end 
of 2015.207  
4.2. Turkey: Military Threats and Security 
The Republic of Turkey was founded on the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, 
but this transition was not a peaceful one. After the end of the First World War, the 
Ottoman Empire was stripped to a small territory in Central Anatolia, which sparked 
the Turkish Independence War. During the Turkish Independence War, Turkey fought 
against France, Armenia, the UK, and Greece, and before the conclusion of the war 
the sultanate was abolished, thus ending the six-century rule of the Ottoman Empire. 
After the war Turkey moved to a more neutral position in favor of status quo, which 
Ankara kept during the inter-bellum period and for most of the Second World War. 
However, after the Second World War, Turkey came under demands from the Soviet 
Union about making territorial changes in the Turkish eastern border, and giving 
military bases to the Soviet Union on the Bosporus. To counter the Soviet demands 
and gather support, Turkey started to deepen its relations with the Western Block and 
send troops to the Korean War with the hopes of entering the then newly founded 
NATO. 
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The Soviet Union as a threat only ceased to exist when the Soviet Union 
dissolved. However, even though the Soviet Union dissolved, the Russian threat to 
Turkey persisted. Despite the good relations since the 1990s and 2000s, Russia is the 
only country in region that poses a threat to Turkish security. The rise of revisionism 
in Russia under Putin, and especially the Russian military intervention in Georgia, the 
annexation of Crimea and the ongoing separatist war in Ukraine reminded Turkey that 
Russia could be a threat. As of the September 2015, there is also the Russian 
intervention in the Syrian Civil War, where Russia has deployed troops to conduct 
operations against anti-Assad forces and launched missiles from its ships in the 
Caspian Sea, which may be read as a show as to its military capabilities to regional 
countries.208 This Russian threat became more visible when Turkey shot down a 
Russian plane that entered her air space on 24 November 2015.209 Since then the 
ongoing tension between Turkey and Russia did not spill in to an open conflict but had 
its effects on other fields. 
The second military threat perceived by Turkey was Greece. Although Greece 
was in no position to compete demographically, militarily or economically, starting 
from the 1960s, Greece had been perceived as a threat. There were several reasons for 
this perception. First, Turkey fought the main bulk of its Independence War against 
Greece, which created a lasting enmity towards Greece, second, the Turkish minority 
in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey and the hardship and discrimination both 
sides faced, third, aerial and maritime border problems in the Aegean Sea and lastly 
the Cyprus problem. Despite the fact that Greek military power did not pose a real 
threat to the Turkish military power, both countries continued their arms race. From 
the 1960s until the 2000s Turkey maintained a bittersweet relationship with Greece, 
with occasional détentes and escalations. Even though both nations were members of 
the NATO, there were occasions when they were on the brink of war. Especially during 
the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and during the maritime border 
crisis in 1996, conflicts almost turned into a war. The Greek threat affected the Turkish 
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military strategy so much that the only non-NATO assigned army in the Turkish land 
forces was the Aegean army formed to directly face a possible Greek offense. As of 
2015 Greece is no longer perceived as a military threat by Turkey, due to the Greek 
economic collapse and because it has fallen behind its military means. Still, most of 
the problems, such as those in Cyprus and Aegean maritime zones, between Turkey 
and Greece have not been resolved, and furthermore, Turkey’s ascension process with 
the EU where Greece has veto power over Turkey could create another obstacle.210 
The third military threat Turkey faces is the Kurdish separatist terrorist group, 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). After the rebellions in the early years of Turkey’s 
foundation, Turkey was suspicious towards its Kurdish population, which formed the 
largest minority group in the country. These suspicions led to discrimination and 
assimilation policies, which then increased the resolve of the opposition against those 
policies. The PKK was founded in 1974 and carried out its first great attack in 1984. 
After its first attack, the conflict escalated and there were continuous fighting until the 
end of the 1990s. Since the early 2000s the conflict cooled down, and under the JDP 
government there has been a peace process and negotiations between the government 
and the PKK. However, the renewed clashes in 2015 indicate a peaceful solution or an 
end to the conflict cannot be expected soon.211 
The burden that the PKK puts on Turkey’s economy and military is different 
than the first two threats. Soviet and Greek threats were military threats that came from 
other countries, therefore such conflicts could be counter-measured. However, the 
PKK is not a state, apart from few training camps in the region it has no permanent 
base. It is an insurgency spread among the civilian population, therefore any measure 
that will be enacted is likely to affect non-participant civilians. But more importantly, 
it is nearly impossible to totally differentiate non-participants from members, which 
creates a security gap. Furthermore, a terrorist organization can become a tool for any 
rival country, and it is a liability that cannot be afforded by a country, which tries to 
become a regional power. 
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4.2.1. Turkey’s Military Alliances and Security Agreements 
Since its establishment, the Republic of Turkey tried to resolve its security issues 
via regional security organizations, which would provide coordination against any 
country outside of the region while solving the problems of the region with mutual 
understanding. The Treaty of Saadabad in 1937 and the Balkan Pact in 1934 can be 
read in this practice. Both agreements were made before the upcoming Second World 
War, and aimed to resolve regional issues. The Treaty of Saadabad helped resolve the 
territorial disputes between Iraq and Iran, and promised cooperation against an outside 
invasion, however failed to address the participation of Iran by the UK and the Soviet 
Union during the Second World War.212 The Balkan Pact aimed to organize regional 
countries against any possible aggression from Bulgaria or an invasion by Italy. 
Although it helped resolve the problems between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, it 
failed to address the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece.213 
After the Second World War, Turkey found itself alone, facing the Soviet Union. 
Due to the reluctance of Turkey to enter the Second World War, allies were reluctant 
to help Turkey. However, as stated previously, because of the Greek Civil War, the 
Soviet demands for bases on the Bosporus, and refusal to agree to have control over 
nuclear weapons pushed the US to help Turkey under the Truman Doctrine in 1947.214 
Three years after its foundation Turkey joined the NATO in 1952. 
After the Turkish entrance in the NATO, Ankara organized its military structure 
according to NATO standards. The Turkish military was re-organized according to the 
NATO doctrine. Turkey with its large army was seen as the eastern vanguard of the 
NATO against a possible Soviet offense. Turkey hosted several NATO airbases, radars 
and other kinds of military installations.215 Turkey mainly hosted airbases, where US 
planes with atomic bombs were placed, due to Turkey’s geographical position where 
aircrafts deployed in Turkey could easily hit targets in the Soviet Union over the Black 
Sea. Over the years, Turkey became an important strategic and military partner in the 
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organization and had the second largest army after the US and a large air fleet with 
experienced pilots. But Turkey’s relations with the NATO were not always good. 
During the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, American President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter 
to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, where he declared the US and the NATO 
would not come to the aid of Turkey in case of a Soviet military intervention in a 
Turkish-Greek crisis. 
Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct 
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO 
allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in 
Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO 
allies.216 
This letter created a wave of shock in Turkey against the NATO and the US, 
which Turkey saw as an unquestionable ally against the Soviet Union.217 Effects of 
this move were seen in the Turkish military intervention to Cyprus in 1974, where 
Turkey did the operation anyway, despite the criticism of the Western Block. To the 
further surprise of Ankara, Washington reacted to the intervention with an arms 
embargo. After the Jonson Letter and the 1974 US Arms Embargo, Ankara realized 
that it could not entirely rely on the NATO for security, and thus founded its first and 
only non-NATO commissioned army, the Aegean army, in 1974 as a direct defensive 
measure against a possible Greek offense after Greece armed the Aegean islands that 
were close to Turkey.218 
Despite all this, Turkey has been an important member of the NATO. Since 
1999, Turkey sent forces to the NATO missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya 
and helped patrol the Mediterranean Sea against terrorists, pirates and human 
traffickers. Turkey’s importance for the NATO was thought to be lowered after the 
end of the Cold War. However, the Gulf War, the Yugoslav Wars, the US War on 
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Terror, and the Syrian Civil War reminded that Europe and the US are far from being 
threatened. Thus Turkey’s geostrategic position became important once again.219 
The importance of the NATO for Turkey in the past was a security umbrella 
against the Soviet Union. Since Turkey alone could offer little resistance to an 
aggression from the Soviet Union, it needed a security organization for protection. But 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ankara’s expectations of NATO’s role 
increased. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs site states, “Turkey attaches the 
utmost importance to NATO’s role in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area and in providing a forum for political-military consultations on topics of 
interest to its member.”220 From this statement it can be read that Turkey sees the 
NATO military intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia as legitimate actions to preserve 
regional peace, even though the NATO is a defensive alliance and neither of these 
countries were member states. 
The importance of the NATO for Turkey continued, even after the end of the 
Cold War. Since the start of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey’s southern border has been 
affected by the clashes over time. When some stray rockets and projectiles hit the 
Turkish side of the border, Turkey asked the NATO for patriot defense systems to 
provide security to its southern cities against any possible missile or rocket attacks 
from the Syrian side in 2012.221 Since the Syrian government had chemical and 
biological weapons, Turkey was afraid that it could use those weapons as a desperate 
last attack, which would be devastating for Turkey’s border region.222 With the start 
of direct Russian military intervention in Syria in September 2015, the civil war 
entered a new phase where aircrafts belonging to the NATO and Russia fly over the 
same zones with military aims. Russian planes made incursions into Turkish air space, 
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which the NATO condemned in strong words.223 NATO offered to station more 
missile defense systems, against further incursions from Russia.224 
The US is one of the few great powers, which Turkey did not directly fight in 
the past225, therefore enjoyed better relations than other great powers. While Turkey 
was skeptical of France and the UK due to their mandates in the Middle East and was 
afraid of a possible move against its territories from the Soviet Union, the US had no 
direct territorial or hegemonic appearance in the region. Therefore, Turkey had no 
reason to fear the US. In the inter-bellum period there were few interactions between 
both countries. However, Turkey became a country of interest during the Second 
World War due to its strategic location, and after the war it kept its geo-strategic 
importance. 
Turkey formed an important part in the US containment policy against the Soviet 
Union. Turkey blocked the direct route between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. 
Because of this, the US supported Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
program. These aid programs made the US one of the most important allies of Turkey 
in a short period. 
Since the 1950s Turkey has been one of the foremost allies of the US, hosted 
several American military bases, and let the US military deploy nuclear warheads and 
missiles on Turkish soil. This made Turkey one of the targets of the Soviet Union, due 
to the close proximity of the missiles to important parts of the Soviet Union. One of 
the major reasons for the Soviet Union’s missile deployment in Cuba may be read as 
a response to the US Jupiter missiles, which were stationed in Turkey and could hit 
Moscow.226 Apart from the actions against the Soviet Union, the US bases in Turkey 
played instrumental role in the US intervention in Lebanon, the Gulf War and the US 
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War on terror. Because of these bases, Turkey is “a key partner for U.S policy in the 
surrounding region”227, especially after the fall of the Pahlavi regime in Iran. 
While Turkey proved to be an important strategic partner for the US for its 
overseas military operations in the Middle East, Near East and the Eastern Europe, the 
US proved to be the main military benefactor of Turkey. The US military aid and 
grants were crucial for the Turkish military in its acquisitions and modernizations. 
Much of the armament and modern equipment of the Turkish armed forces were 
acquired from the US, and this was the reason why the arms embargo was disastrous 
for Turkish-American relations. The US Patton tanks have been the main tanks of 
Turkish armored divisions, even as of 2015, most of the tanks in the Turkish armored 
regiments are either German or American.228 The US was also the main provider of 
aircraft to the Turkish air forces; Turkey has 240 F-16s and more of other American-
origin aircraft.229 
More importantly, apart from being a supplier the US was the main protector of 
Turkey, both in the NATO and outside. Without US support, Turkey would have had 
to bow to Soviet demands after the Second World War. After the Truman Doctrine, 
Turkey found itself supported against the Communist threat from both inside and 
outside. Because of this, Turkey has been in favor of the US, which affected both the 
military and the diplomatic stance. Turkey supported the US goals, even when it 
contradicted its own gains; During the Cold War basing the US planes and missiles 
made Turkey a primary target for Soviet retaliation or pre-emptive strikes, and during 
the Gulf War Turkey let the US to use its facilities and could have become a target for 
Iraqi Scud missiles for harboring American planes.  
4.2.2. Turkish Military Self-Sufficiency 
Ankara’s military self-sufficiency is in contrast to its regional power bid or 
military capacity. Despite fielding an impressive arsenal and a massive army, Turkey 
had little self-sufficiency in terms of production. In its early years, Turkey did not 
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make significant investments in arms production due to other more immediate needs. 
After the Second World War, with acceptance to the Western Block and access to 
American products, Turkey continued its previous trend and bought the necessary 
equipment from other countries rather than producing its own. However, after the 1974 
US Arms Embargo, as an effort to increase its self-sufficiency Turkish armed forces 
formed its own companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Aselsan, Roketsan and Turkish 
Aerospace Industries (TAI) were founded to provide advanced weapons and vehicle 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
Among such companies, TAI was instrumental for the modernization of the 
Turkish Air Force and also provided service to regional countries. Most of the F16s in 
Turkish Air Force were modernized by the TAI.230 It also provided its services to 
regional and allied countries like Egypt231, Jordan232 and Pakistan233. Such production 
and modernization programs helped the TAI gather enough experience to start the 
production of its own designs. The TAI started its own productions by training aircraft; 
drones and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), like Şimşek and Turna 
target drones234, the Hürkuş training aircraft235, and Anka reconnaissance UAV236. But 
more importantly with the experience gathered from both domestic and foreign 
designs, the TAI plans to produce its first fighter aircraft by the 2020s.237 The TAI 
plans to produce a fifth-generator fighter aircraft that is currently called the Turkish 
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Fighter Experimental (TFX) by the 2020s to give Turkish Air Force an edge in the 
race. Ankara wants TFX to be domestically produced to stop further decrease of 
reliance on outside sources. As of the December 2015, the TFX is in the design phase. 
The TAI also produced Turkey’s first domestically produced attack helicopter T129 
ATAK.238  T129 ATAK was produced to fulfill the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces 
as well as the international market.239 The TAI produced Turkish Armed Forces’ order 
and delivered it in 2014, thus Turkish Armed Forces began to use its first domestic 
attack helicopter after decades of foreign productions.240 
Another milestone in Ankara’s national military vehicles program is Turkey’s 
tank project. Since its foundation, Turkish Armed Forces armored regiments had to 
rely on imported tanks, mainly American and German origin. This put Turkey in a 
precarious situation, where the US prohibited Turkey to use the equipment imported 
from the US in Cyprus. Turkey intends to produce a tank that is completely or nearly 
completely produced domestically to be used in the Turkish Armed Forces.241 
However, due to the technical and production issues the production plans were 
delayed. Although Ankara wanted the new tank to be fully domestic, Turkish industrial 
know-how was not sufficient, and the plans and bargains with out-sources were 
problematic. The last part of the problems was solved by finding a domestic producer 
after the initial plans to acquire Japanese and Korean engines failed.242 After the initial 
testing of the first prototypes, Altay tanks are supposed to be ready to be dispatched to 
Turkish Armed forces in 2018.  
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4.3. Japan: Military Threats and Security 
As Turkey, Japan has an imperial history and carries the burdens of this history. 
Apart from two Mongol invasion attempts to Japan in the 13th century, and two 
Japanese invasion attempts to Korea in the 16th century, Japan has isolated itself from 
the rest of the world in military terms. Continental countries, such as Korea and China, 
were not interested in expanding their realms to Japan, thus Japan was left free of 
invasions. Likewise, the internal divisions between the daimyos and the constant 
conflicts also influenced Japan to not have expansionist ideas. However, this changed 
when Japan started to modernize in the late 19th century under the Emperor Meiji. 
When the US ships under the command of Commodore Matthew C. Perry opened 
Japan to foreign trade and influence under the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854, under 
gun-boat diplomacy, Japanese elites saw they could no longer continue their 
isolationist policy to keep their country safe and had to modernize in order to survive. 
This incident was the first external incident Japan faced since the failed Mongol 
invasion attempts. This process turned Japan into a modern industrial state, which 
needed resources to sustain its growing industry.243 To obtain these resources, Japan 
waged war against both of its neighbors, China and Russia, annexed Korea, and later 
during the Second World War attacked the Netherlands, France, the UK, Australia and 
the US. 
During the Second World War Japanese troops committed atrocities in the 
occupied countries, which still stains Tokyo’s relations with many countries in its 
region. During the war, the Japanese Imperial Army carried out numerous massacres, 
war crimes, and started controversial policies, such as the comfort women issue. Even 
seventy years after the Second World War, Japan still has historical problems that 
aggravate its relations with its neighbors.244 These unresolved historical issues sustain 
the portrait of Japan as an aggressor country that is able to attack other countries, 
despite Japan’s more than six decades of peaceful pacifist history. 
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Tokyo’s security problems are caused by its immediate neighbors, China, North 
Korea and Russia. Japan still did not conclude a peace treaty with Russia after the 
Second World War. Although it is unlikely that Russia may become a security problem 
for Japan due to lack of strategic interest, it still has to be taken into plans due to 
Russia’s interventionist policies in the recent years. And more importantly while 
Japanese military expenditure has been at similar levels over the last decades, which 
are fixed to 1% of the Japanese GDP, Russian military spending has been rising each 
year since 1998, and has surpassed Japanese military spending in 2008.245 Russian 
military spending was around $37 billion in 2002, but rose to $61 billion in 2008 and 
$91 billion in 2014, compared to Japan’s $60 billion in 2002, $59 billion in 2008 and 
$59 billion in 2014. North Korea poses little threat to Japan in terms of conventional 
arms, as its military is outdated and North Korea does not have an economy that can 
improve its military forces. However, North Korea has a ballistic missile program and 
a nuclear weapon program, and as was seen in the previous missile tests, it has 
advanced in its programs, despite international pressure. North Korea launched its first 
ballistic missile tests of Taepo-dong-1 in 1998, and from 1998 to 2006 it increased the 
accuracy and the range of its missiles, and carried out an unsuccessful nuclear test in 
2006.246 This makes North Korea a threat for Japan, because even if one missile with 
a nuclear warhead passes through Japanese ballistic missile defense systems it will be 
disastrous for a highly urbanized country like Japan.  
It can be said that the biggest threat to Japan’s security comes from China. 
Although China has claimed to be a peaceful country with harmonic aims rather than 
hegemonic, currently it is one of the two revisionist countries in the region, with the 
other being North Korea. To understand China’s revisionism, understanding its history 
might be helpful. Apart from a brief loss of power in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, China has been the most influential country in the East and South East 
Asia.247 Today, China is trying to assert its old position in the region once more. To 
this end, China is trying to revert its losses in the previous centuries and impose its 
hegemonic position over countries that were once a vassal of China. To revert its 
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territorial loses China has claims on nearly all of its neighbors. To this end, China had 
border clashes with the Soviet Union, wars with both India and Vietnam, made border 
revisions with Central Asian countries, which changed the border in favor of China, 
and has territorial claims on Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, India, and Vietnam. And to 
further escalate the already tense region, China started a program to create artificial 
islands on the South China Sea, to serve as possible military outposts.248 These 
artificial islands were built on coral reefs that were half submerged, and few of the 
islands are as big as four million square meters, have landing strips big enough to land 
military aircraft and can serve as supply and docking points to small and medium 
military ships. Furthermore, these islands are hundreds of kilometers away from China, 
while they are closer to all other claimants; few of these islands are only a few 
kilometers from other nations, which has the potential to further escalate the military 
tension in the region.249 While Beijing’s claims on many places can be backed by 
historic claims, Beijing’s claims on the islands and the fact that it is building military 
bases on the artificial islands shows it has long term military intentions in the region.  
But, what makes Beijing the biggest threat to the region, and to the security of 
Japan, is not Beijing’s desire to return to its status of old times, but the fact that it 
actually has the resources to do so. Chinese military spending has increased more than 
10% over the last ten consecutive years. This increase can be seen as acceptable, due 
to the increase in Beijing’s overall GDP, but as of the end of 2014 Beijing’s annual 
military expenditure was five times of Japan, despite having a GDP of two times of 
Japan.250 And this is only the known spending, as the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute indicates, some part of the Chinese military spending is done 
secretly and there is no way to learn the exact amount spent. Moreover the effects of 
this increase in the military budget can be seen from the recent increase in the quality 
of the Chinese military arsenal. Between 2000 and 2013, Chinese destroyer fleet 
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increased from 20 ships to 29, which makes roughly a 45% increase.251 In the same 
period, the submarine fleet increased from 50 to 63, which makes a 26% percent 
increase, with 6 of the new submarines having capacity of launching ballistic 
missiles.252 More importantly, China bought an aircraft carrier and plans to produce 
two more before 2020. While many battle ships can be explained as defensive 
precautions, an aircraft carrier is not a defensive vessel and shows the desire for a blue 
water fleet, which can act far from its mainland to pursue the military aims of the 
country. Similarly, the Chinese Air Force went under a rapid upgrading and 
enlargement process. Since 2000 the air forces saw a rapid decrease in the number of 
aircraft, but on the contrary, there has been great improvement in the quality of the 
aircraft. While the number of the second-generation fighter aircrafts decreased, third-
generation and fourth-generation aircrafts replaced them in the inventory253, and 
furthermore China is developing fifth-generation stealth fighter jets which can match 
those of the US. The most worrisome development for Japan’s national security is the 
number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and short-range missiles. 
From 1999 to 2007, the number of ICBM’s tripled and the number of short-range 
missiles nearly quintupled.254 Japan is one of the most likely targets for these missiles, 
and adding the Chinese nuclear arsenal to this makes it one of the gravest threats to 
Japan. 
Beijing claims to be harmonic, rather than hegemonic. During an interview with 
the Japanese press in 2007 Chinese Premier stated: 
China is committed to peaceful development. This is determined by China's 
national conditions, its cultural tradition and the nature of its system. China's 
development will not affect or threaten any country. China is still a developing 
country. It does not seek hegemony. China has a long way to go before it can 
become a developed country. It will never seek hegemony even when it is 
developed. For a big country with a population of 1.3 billion, China's defense 
expenditure, in terms of either size or proportion, is not high. It is lower than that 
of many developed countries and even many developing countries. Let me make 
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it perfectly clear: China's limited military capabilities are solely for upholding 
its security and national unity.255 
But at the same time China accused Japan’s ballistic missile defense system as 
“far exceed the defensive needs of Japan” and risks a regional arms race.256 How the 
ICBMs, nuclear warheads, aircraft carriers and an expanding air force are defensive 
actions but a ballistic defense system is offensive and may trigger an arms race is 
incomprehensible. In such an environment, Japan has the lowest military expenditure 
compared to its GDP in its neighborhood. In 2014 Chinese expenditure was 2%, 
Russian expenditure was 4.5% and South Korean expenditure 2.6% while Japanese 
expenditure was 1%.257  
4.3.1. Japan’s Bilateral Security Agreements and the US 
Japan, unlike Turkey, does not maintain its security via an international security 
organization, but via bilateral security agreements. While the NATO is active in North 
America and Europe, there is no such organization in the East and South East Asia. 
Alternatively, Japan has bilateral and trilateral security agreements on a nation-to-
nation level, similar to pre-First World War European alliances. Japan has bilateral 
agreements with India258, Australia259 and the US260, and a trilateral agreement with 
Australia and the US, as pointed out earlier.261 Although it did not come into effect, 
there were talks about quadrilateral security agreement among Japan, the US, Australia 
and India, today four countries still continue the Malabar military exercises. Most of 
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the agreements are defensive in nature, where the military support is often bound to a 
defensive clause. 
The first and foremost bilateral military agreement was signed with the US. 
During the US occupation period, occupation administration disbanded all Japanese 
armed forces. After that, it was the US’ responsibility to provide order and security in 
Japan and this was formalized with the Security Treaty Between Japan and the United 
States in 1951.262 However, the Korean War showed the regional countries were in 
danger of Communist takeover. Because of this the US occupation administration 
allowed the establishment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 1954. The 1951 
Security Treaty was turned in to Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between 
Japan and the United States of America in 1960, where Japan also promised to help 
the US in Japan’s defense.263 The articles IV and V promised if Japan’s security came 
under threat, the US would come to aid of its ally. Under the Yoshida Doctrine264, this 
American guarantee to its security gave Japan the ability to develop its economic 
reconstruction, but when the US President Richard Nixon made a surprise visit to 
China in 1971, Japan was caught unready. Until then, Japan trusted the US against any 
possible Chinese threat, but when the US showed it was ready to conciliate with China, 
Japanese security based on the US came under question. However, even after a few 
changes in the treaties, withdrawal of some of the troops and closure of bases, the US 
is still the most important security partner of Japan. 
The question as to whether Japan can utterly trust the US with its defense paved 
way to the growing desire to change Japan’s post-war military structure. Especially 
during the prime ministership of Junichiro Koizumi, between 2001 and 2006, and 
Shinzo Abe’s first term, in 2007, Japan tried to diversify its defense strategy. Japan 
tried to diversify its security agreements rather than solely depending on the US. In 
2007 Shinzo Abe visited Australia and India, promoting bilateral security agreements 
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and further agreements that included the US. Since Abe’s second term, started in 2012; 
these efforts again became a primary cornerstone of the Japanese foreign policy. This 
new Japanese security policy was perceived as an “Asian NATO” to keep China 
contained through the coalition of the endangered regional countries.265 This was 
called the Asian NATO due to Abe’s continuous reference to the shared western values 
of possible members against an authoritarian regime, in the Asian case, China. 
The 1960 Security Treaty was changed a few times, but in all revisions the US 
restated it was the guarantor statue for the security of Japan. However, due to the 
economic interdependency between China and the US, it is still doubtful whether 
Washington would back Tokyo against Beijing in a possible confrontation in the East 
China Sea, especially in an environment where Beijing’s actions become more and 
more challenging. However, the most important point of the later revisions is that 
Japan promised to help the US militarily outside of Japan, which was criticized as 
Japan’s return to its military past.  
After the China-India War in 1962266 and the continuous Chinese claims on the 
Indian Territory, Japan found a strategic partner in India against China. While India 
and Japan had what the other needed economically, with one side having capital and 
the other side having human and material resources, what made them possible military 
partners was Beijing’s attitude. After its initial independence, Delhi maintained 
positive relations with Beijing, since both countries needed to consolidate their 
administration. However, after the 1960s, China turned its attention to its losses in the 
19th century, and had considerable tension with India. With both countries’ successful 
integration into world economy, India and China have massive economic capacity at 
their hands to pursue their foreign policy. Especially, the Chinese military build-up 
over the recent years created great concern in India, who is one of the main possible 
targets. 
When Shinzo Abe became prime minister in 2006 for the first time, he 
approached India as a potential strategic partner in the region. His visit to India in 2007 
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led to the Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership.267 
There, Japan and India agreed to expand their cooperation in many fields, and in the 
same year Japan started to participate in Malabar military exercises. Despite not 
participating in some of the exercises, Japan participated in Malabar exercises in 2009, 
2011, 2014, and latest in 2015. 268 Although this initiative was cut short by Abe’s 
electoral loss, when Abe became prime minister again in 2012 he immediately 
restarted the initiative. Abe visited India in 2014 again, and this time the Japan-India 
Joint Statement: Intensifying the Strategic and Global Partnership expressed stronger 
defensive cooperation, continuation of the joint military exercises, and a desire for 
trilateral defense cooperation, which would include the US.269 As Asia’s second and 
third military spenders, an Indian-Japanese cooperation may prove to be a great 
improvement for Japan’s security diagram. 
Australia has drawn big interest from the Japanese policy makers starting from 
Koizumi and continued during Abe’s first prime ministership. After Koizumi’s visit to 
Australia in 2002, a joint press statement was given by Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, where they promoted “an 
expanding dialogue and cooperation between the two nations on security and defense 
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issues, underpinned by their close strategic interests”.270 When Abe took the position 
of the prime ministership, Japan engaged in a new series of initiatives towards 
Australia. His visit in 2007 resulted in Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation.271 This declaration promised annual meetings between the Foreign 
Ministers and Defense Ministers of both countries. Australia participated in Malabar 
joint naval exercises in 2007, alongside Japan. However, the instabilities on the 
political stages of both countries again stopped further development of the cooperation 
and the cooperation was left at a meeting level, and was not implemented further at a 
practical level. But with Abe’s second term in Japan in 2012 and the Liberal Party’s 
return under Tony Abbot in Australia in 2013, possibility for future and further 
cooperation was on the rise. The defense cooperation was continued as planned in 
2007, with the 6th Defense and Foreign Ministers meeting was held in November 
2015.272 Japan is among the competitors for the improvement of the Australian 
submarine fleet.273 But Australia is still reluctant to signing an agreement with Japan. 
Furthermore, the new Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is considered pro-
Chinese, and how this will turnout for Japanese-Australian partnership is yet to be 
seen.274 
4.3.2. Japan’s Military Self-Sufficiency 
When the Second World War ended, the US tried to make Japan a demilitarized 
country, as Germany. To this end, they disbanded all branches of the military, 
abolished the Ministry of Defense and put a clause in the new constitution where Japan 
forfeit its right to use arms, except in the case of an offense against its homeland. But 
the emergence of the Korean War showed the US that they needed a strong ally in the 
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East Asia, which could play a vanguard role in case of a Communist offense until the 
US forces could be moved there. Because of this, and with the fresh memories of the 
Second World War, the American occupation authorities let Japan to found Self-
Defense Forces in 1954, which was an improvement for the Japanese police force but 
was still weaker than a conventional military force. 
However, the ongoing Cold War made the US government re-consider their 
stance on Japanese military, and with the later amendments on the Japan-US security 
agreement, the Japanese SDF turned from ‘riot police’ with light weapons to a military 
force with land, naval and air branches, and obtained aircrafts and ships. But still, the 
SDF is a questionable military at its best. Its only source of manpower as of 2015 is 
volunteers, as there is no conscription in the Japanese constitution. Furthermore the 
SDF has no combat experience of any kind. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
renounces Japan’s right to wage war or use arms, other than self-defense. Article 9 of 
the Japanese constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to 
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.275 
Article 9 forbade Japan to send its forces to any combat area, which included the 
UN Peacekeeping Missions. In cases where Japan participated in the UN Peacekeeping 
Missions, like Cambodia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, Japanese troops were given 
non-combat roles as engineering, supplies, logistics and training missions. This 
deprived Japanese forces from any combat experience outside, and since Japan had no 
interior terrorist organizations, Japanese forces’ experience is limited to training and 
their military exercises.  
Japan needed to amend Article 9 and become a normal power before it could 
become a regional power. Japan with its constitutional restrains had a difficult time in 
showing its military importance to other countries and gathering support for an Asian 
NATO. Article 9 was amended in the Japanese Lower House of the Parliament in May 
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2015, and in the Upper House in September 2015, marking an end to the seventy-year 
pacifism.276 Also, the SDF and all its branches are, and will likely continue to be, 
behind in military inventory in the face of their Chinese counterparts. Therefore, the 
military capability of the SDF forces is not important in the inventory or numbers, but 
the ability to help its allies. The new law allows Japan to send SDF forces in cases 
where its allies are under threat of force, which can greatly help Japan in its military 
agreements. Previously, Japan could not commit such a promise because it was against 
its constitution. 
4.4. Evaluation 
Unlike some contender countries, such as Brazil or Mexico, Japan and Turkey 
are in tumultuous regions where their military capabilities constitute an important part 
of their bid for regional power. Without the ability to pursue their policies on the hard 
realities of today’s world, neither country can be successful in their bid. A middle 
power can have interests in a region, but when its interests are hurt, it can simply 
change its attention to another region in the world. But a regional power is entrenched 
to its region, therefore it needs the military capacity to react to regional developments 
and provide security for itself and for its region. 
Currently, Turkey is considered a military power in its region, due to the 
immense size of its armed forces and its military inventory. Furthermore, Turkey pays 
great attention to increase the effectiveness of its military while trying to expand its 
arsenal. In the recent years Turkish armed forces saw a decrease in numbers, while the 
number of contracted military personal increased. This may give Turkey an edge in 
military terms, where professional soldiers can spend long years in their service area 
and become experts in their region rather than conscripts rotating every few months. 
The investment on the Turkish military arsenal, both in terms of numbers and 
modernization, is also a move that was badly needed. While Turkey has an impressive 
inventory in overall numbers compared to other countries in its region, some of its 
equipment is old and in need of modernization. This modernization was normally done 
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via contractors from other countries, mainly Western, which then made Turkey a 
regular costumer. But as seen from the 1974 American Arms Embargo or the recent 
Turkish-Israeli problems, this continuous dependency on other countries may hinder 
Turkish military forces. For a country with a regional power claim, this is a great 
problem that requires immediate attention. 
However, the effectiveness of the Turkish military at a regional level is yet to be 
proven. The ongoing Syrian Civil War showed the lack of aerial and ballistic missile 
defense systems in Turkey. The ballistic missile defense system contract that was 
given to a Chinese company also showed that Ankara’s military commitments might 
prove a hindrance on Ankara’s future plans to develop its military capacity, as NATO 
protested over it. Turkey was unable to prove the systematic control of its Syrian 
border, and was accused of being lenient on the border crossing which was abused by 
terrorist organizations to smuggle weapons and fighters. With the recent entrance of 
Russia in the Syrian conflict, Turkey was unable to prevent the continuous violations 
of the Russian planes in its airspace. To what extent Ankara’s military alliances will 
help it in a possible offence against its national security is another question. With the 
bitter memories of the Johnson Letter and the 1974 US Arms Embargo, to what extent 
can Turkey trust its alliances with the NATO and the US is doubtful. With an 
increasingly interventionist Russia, Turkey can find itself in a hostile environment very 
easily. In the recent years the US showed that it could not afford an active conflict with 
Russia, first in Georgia then in Ukraine.  
In contrast to Turkey, the security problems that Japan is facing shows that Japan 
needs to become a normal power before it can become a regional power. Japan with 
its current military restrains will have a hard time providing security for its own region. 
Surely Japan’s military capacity is greater than many countries, but due to the situation 
in its region, Japan cannot be considered a regional military power. Japan can produce 
complex military vehicles, and is increasing the SDF’s power capacity, but still 
Japanese armed forces are no match to those of Russia or China. While the military 
power of China increases, the gap between Japan and China will keep increasing, 
where Japan cannot compete. Recent changes and improvements in Japan’s armed 
forces can only prove influential if Japan can organize a NATO-like organization 
against China. 
For Japan’s security, Japan is bound to find partners, and due to China’s military 
investments and revisionism Japan can find partners in the region. The relations with 
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India regarding a coordinated defense policy are promising. India’s political stability 
and economic capacity mark such a relationship as likely to improve. But on the other 
hand, Australia is stuck between its concern over the rising Chinese military power 
and interventionism and Australia’s trade relations with China. This makes Australia 
highly vulnerable to Chinese economic retaliation, in case of Japanese-Australian 
security cooperation. Thus an Asian NATO seems unlikely unless Japan puts 
considerable resources to counter China’s economic relations with the regional 
countries. Further, South Korea can be the partner Japan needs in the region, as both 
counties are threatened by China and North Korea, both are allies of the US and both 
are democratic countries with similar values. However, Japan’s imperial history and 
its rule in Korea create historical obstacles. To further restrain the relations, Japan 
insists on not making the necessary apologies and acknowledgments regarding the 
historical issues demanded by South Korea. In a recent meeting, where Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe and Korean Prime Minister Park Geun-hye met for the first time, 
Abe stated both countries needed to resolve the historical issues and “build a new 
future of forward-looking Japan-Korea relations”.277 This new opening can be the 
catalyzer that was needed to amend the historical issues between both nations and form 
a stronger front against both North Korea and China. 
Furthermore, Japan is a democracy and its military effectiveness is bound to its 
political stability. Since 2001 Japan had seven prime ministers, and thirteen defense 
ministers in just eight years since its foundation. Nearly all the Japanese prime 
ministers lacked the political support or had little time to make a change in politics. 
This political uncertainty causes administrative problems. No prime minister had the 
support to make changes in Article 9, except Abe, and the flow of appointments causes 
interruptions which than sabotage a consistent and continues policy. 
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Compared to Tokyo, Ankara certainly proceeded a greater distance since 2002. 
The two liabilities Ankara had to cover in the security area were to solve its 
dependency on foreign equipment and technology in the military field problem and the 
PKK terror. Via its domestic production projects, Turkey is planning to greatly reduce 
its dependency on more advanced military equipment such as tanks, rockets and 
planes, and this certainly increases its power projection. However, on the PKK 
problems it still holds, as of December 2015, it intensified to a new scale. The PKK 
tries to openly defy Turkey in civilian areas, which it could do before. The new projects 
like tank and aircraft cannot be applied to the conflict with the PKK. Therefore while 
Ankara solved one of its problems, the other more immediate and more demanding 
security problem still needs to be solved. 
Tokyo on the other hand still has the same security dilemma it had in 2002, what 
to do against Beijing. While the act that enabled Japan to send its troops overseas 
certainly strengthened Tokyo’s hand and is an important step in Japan’s transformation 
from civilian power to normal power, it is not enough to solve Japan’s security 
problems. No matter what Japan does it will not be able to stand against China on its 
own, similar to Turkey’s situation against the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Therefore, it 
is of utmost importance that Japan create a security organization to bring stability in 
the East and South East Asia and gain the ability to stand against Chinese 
encroachment. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Prior to 2002, Turkish and Japanese foreign policies can be read as reactive to 
the changes occurring in their region than taking the lead in these events. Their long 
standing attitude to favor status quo, and their reluctance to adapting to the changes in 
their region and worldwide were results of their reactivity. However, the reasons of 
this attitude should be understood before any insightful comment can be made on the 
topic. After the aggressions Japan committed before and during the Second World 
War, the Allied Powers stripped Japan much of its military power. Together with the 
material and human cost, those wars left Tokyo with no choice but to focus on the 
rebuilding itself. To this end, Tokyo left much of its security to Washington’s hands, 
and completely focused on its economy. Similarly Turkey came out of Turkish 
Independence War with catastrophic human and material loses which limited its 
foreign policy capacity in the 1920s and 1930s. Prior to 2002, the only two occasions 
where Ankara took the initiative were the annexation of Hatay in 1939 and the Turkish 
military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Japan on the other hand, was docile and 
repeatedly apologized for its wartime activities. Except a few history issues, which 
Japan insists on refusing, Japan kept a low profile. 
Since 2002, both countries have actively been trying to push a more proactive 
foreign policy. This was a surprising move that unsettled regional dynamics due to the 
unexpectancy. Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Japan under 
Koizumi and Abe’s Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) wanted to become determining 
actors in their regions, to prove themselves as regional powers. World politics since 
2002 have been in favor of such a change with some old and new actors that were 
trying to create a new place for themselves or reorient themselves. Russia under 
Vladimir Putin has been making a comeback after a decade of uncertainty, the EU was 
trying to push for a constitution union, which could pave way for further integration 
of the EU, new actors such as Brazil were trying to be more active in international 
politics and etc. In such a strong wind of change Turkey and Japan also tried to change 
their positions; both Ankara and Tokyo used nearly the same tools in their bid to 
regional power, which was the use of developmental aid, democracy promotion and 
improvement of their military capacity. 
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Turkey and Japan both used developmental aid as a foreign policy tool with some 
success. Turkey mainly used the developmental aid to increase its soft power in Arab 
and African countries while also creating a new market for its goods. While the 
increase of the trade volumes between Turkey and those countries may seem as a 
success for the second part, the extent of Turkish soft power and the effects of 
developmental aid on its soft power is not certain. Turkish developmental aid was a 
potential supplementing tool for its democracy promotion, as seen in the economic 
process with Syria before the civil war. But as of the end of 2015 the results of the 
Turkey’s democracy promotion are not very positive. Therefore, this also restricts the 
effects of the Turkish developmental aid. For Japan on the other hand, the 
developmental aid was a tool to increase economic relations and a supplement to both 
its democracy promotion and security needs. In this field Japan was more successful 
in achieving its aims than Turkey. Japan provided regional countries, like Indonesia 
and Vietnam; with the capital investment they needed and used it to strengthen its 
security relations with India and Australia. 
The use of the democracy promotion, on the other hand, brought upon mixed 
results for both parties. Until the Syrian Civil War and the fall of Morsi in Egypt, the 
Turkish democracy promotion seemed to be successful, especially with respect to the 
Arab Spring at its height. Turkey was considered as a role model by the Tunisian and 
Egyptian post-Arab Spring leaders, and the process with Syria was expected to enter a 
new political and social reformation phase. However, in 2011 the Arab Spring started 
to crack, the protests in Syria was crushed by the government forces, which started a 
multi-sided bloody civil war. Before the Syrian Civil War could be brought to a 
decisive end, the post-Arab Spring Morsi government in Egypt was ousted by a 
military coup. At the same time Libya also entered a multi-sided civil war. The Syrian 
Civil War has been going on non-stop and only intensified with the passing years, the 
coup government of the Egypt legitimized itself with local elections and international 
recognition, and moreover now the opposition of Saudi Arabia and other countries 
which previously did not continue their protests against their governments will be more 
insisting on their demands with the regimes’ latest atrocities against them. In such an 
environment of raising discontent and crackdown, Turkey is more likely to face 
difficulties using democracy promotion as a part of its foreign policy. 
For Japan democracy promotion combined with prosperity aimed to show 
regional countries that it could provide a better model to them than China and convince 
   103 
 
them to join its side. Japan’s “Asian Democratic Security Diamond” was intended to 
reflect this idea, that the union of the democratic countries of the region against an 
authoritarian bully. The union of prosperity and democracy seemed as an appealing 
idea, at least in the planning phase. However in practice, thus far the only two 
democracies that Japan could start a military cooperation with were Australia and 
India. The main targets of this security diamond, developing democracies of the 
Southeast Asia, are still hesitant to commit themselves. 
Considering their security policies, both Japan and Turkey could be considered 
successful to some extent. Ankara started policies that would help it to develop its 
domestic arms industry further. Through this initiatives Ankara was able to solve one 
of its most crucial security gaps, its dependency on external sources for the 
modernization and acquisition of its military arsenal. Since the lessons of the 1974 US 
Arms Embargo, Turkey was well aware of this situation and with its new found 
industrial capacity and economic resources Ankara was determined to solve it. On the 
other hand, the security threats in the region against Turkey have increased. Ankara 
felt the full weight of the Russian threat for the first time since the Soviet threat in 
1950s. On 24 November 2015, Turkey shot down one of the Russian military aircraft 
that strayed in to its airspace, the Russian reaction was a full-fledged economic war as 
well as threats to do further as much as it can. NATO supported Turkey against Russia, 
which was a relief for Turkey’s fear of a second Johnson Letter. Turkey’s third security 
threat, the domestic terror, is still a question to be solved, but as of December 2015 the 
direction, which the situation will take is highly unpredictable. The JDP government 
who previously tried to solve the problem through negotiations in a peaceful manner 
has to make a choice, whether to continue those negotiations despite attacks from PKK 
or give in to the more hawkish side and fight fire with fire. Furthermore, the ISIL 
became a new security threat, both internally and externally. 
Japan likewise was unable to solve its primary security threat, China. Although 
the last decade was a time of change for the Japanese security it still faces the same 
threat. In 2015, Japan under Shinzo Abe was finally able to make the big leap from 
being a civic power without an army to a normal power with a standing army. This 
was a move that significantly strengthened Japan’s hand for future military agreements 
and to strengthen its army. However, Japan was unable to create a block against China. 
Apart from its main ally the US, Japan was able to find two allies in the region India 
and Australia. India is in favor of such a military alliance because it feels threatened 
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by Chinese claims on its lands and China’s growing confrontational attitude in the 
region. Australia on the other hand has no clear stance about the issue because of its 
internal politics and different opinions of Australian parties towards China. Countries 
like Malaysia, Vietnam and Philippines, which should be more threatened by the 
Chinese artificial islands, are reluctant towards an Asian NATO. 
However, the aim of this thesis was not to investigate whether Ankara and Tokyo 
were able to or unable to get all the intended results. The analysis was made according 
to the Schoeman and Schrim’s conditions as to whether Turkey and Japan were able 
to fulfill those conditions or not. According to the conditions set by these scholars 
Turkish and Japanese foreign policies have been analyzed. 
Since 2002, Turkey had significantly increased its power capacity. After the 
economic crisis in 2001, Turkish economy was recovered in the last decade. Its GDP 
rose from $232 billion in 2002 to $798 billion in 2014. At the same time Turkey took 
huge steps to improve its military power. But more importantly, Turkey who 
previously secluded itself from its region and tried to identify itself solely with the 
European identity turned its face to its region. Since 2002, Turkey has improved its 
ties with African and Middle Eastern countries which strengthened Turkey wider in 
the region. However, although Ankara’s power increased in general and specifically 
in the region, it still may not be enough to become a regional power. Beyond Syria and 
Iraq, Ankara’s influence is hardly visible in regional crisis, and even there Ankara 
could not accomplish what it intended. Ankara was unable to get a UN resolution on 
Syria or convince Iraq to expel the PKK and its camps. So even if Turkey’s power is 
increasing it is still not enough to match its aims. Turkey lacks the religious influence 
of Iran or the military power of Russia, and this causes problems when competing with 
those countries. Japan, on the other hand, had not been successful on the economic 
field, compared to other countries in the region, although Japanese economy rose from 
$3,980 billion in 2002 to $5,954 billion in 2012. Interestingly it started to shrink again 
under Abe’s second term in 2012, despite his plans to recover Japanese economy under 
‘Abenomics’ and declined to $4,601 billion in 2014. Japan’s military capacity also 
stayed stagnant. Although the amendment of the Article 9, which banned the use of 
arms on foreign soil by Japanese armed forces, strengthened Tokyo’s hand in military 
terms, Japanese military still is weak. Japan’s power and whether that power is enough 
to obtain the status of regional power is a dilemma. If Japan was in another part of the 
   105 
 
world it could have been a regional power, but Japan is neighbor to China and Japan’s 
current power cannot compete with China. 
Since 2002, Turkey and Japan show the desire to become a regional power. Their 
policies under the JDP and the LDP are a result of this desire. While Turkey tries to 
become a regional power for being determinant power in the region, Japan wants to 
balance China and improve its status in the East Asia. Turkey’s refusal to give military 
access to the USA in the invasion of Iraq, or its eagerness to show itself as a role model 
and to start relations with the post-Arab Spring governments can be seen in this 
direction. Japan’s awakening from its long slumber is also a result of this desire to 
become a regional power. After decades of reactiveness, Japan started to implement a 
proactive foreign policy and launched initiatives like the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity in 2007 and the Asian Democratic Security Diamond in 2012. Those 
initiatives were made because of this desire to become a regional power. 
In terms of activity, Japan and Turkey have been in a proactive foreign policy 
period. Both countries used developmental aid and democracy promotion to increase 
both their soft and hard powers. Also they were actively engaged in activities that 
would help them to solve their security gaps. All activities that were given in detail in 
the previous chapters were done to achieve their final aim, the bid to become a regional 
power. 
The acceptance might be seen as the most problematic part about Turkey and 
Japan’s regional bid. If the regional attitude towards Turkey and Turkey’s role in the 
region is looked upon, it may be seen that Turkey’s place as a regional power is still 
debatable. Although proponents may claim there can be no changes in the region 
without taking Ankara into account, this is a weak claim. It is true that Ankara wields 
some influence in the Balkans and the Middle East, for example without taking Ankara 
into the plans there can be no solution to Iraq or Syria’s problems. However, this may 
be very well the result of being a neighbor, and not a result of being a regional power. 
Turkey is not a side of the crisis in Yemen, and Turkey’s involvement in Libya and 
Egypt was not decisive. Turkey was looked upon as a mediator between Israel and 
Syria between 2008 and 2010, which was a big boost for Turkey’s regional role. But 
after Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War or the Egyptian 2013 Coup, the 
number of sides that may look to Turkey as a mediator is dwindling. Furthermore, the 
Syrian Civil War created the real test ground for the Turkey’s power in the region. 
Turkey was unable to unite the opposition to topple Bashar Assad. Turkey’s inability 
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to create a change when opposed by other regional powers, Russia and Iran, 
demonstrates the limited capacity of Ankara’s current power in the region. 
Japan, although has long been accepted as a regional power, is gradually losing 
its ground to China. Since 1890s, Japan had been more powerful than China due to 
Japan’s successful modernization and reformation process. However, this changed 
after China managed to reform its economy and integrated itself to international 
economic system in the 1980s. After three decades of rapid economic growth, China 
now has the economic capacity to pursue a more active foreign policy. Beijing’s 
increasing confrontational actions in the East and South East Asia forces Japan to show 
reaction, but so far Japan has been unable to confront China. After China declared a 
large are between Japan and Taiwan as air identification defense zone or declared its 
maritime borders around the artificial islands in the South China Sea, Japanese reaction 
was minimal. Furthermore, the increasing aggressions in to Japanese aerial and 
maritime borders by the Chinese aircrafts or navy vessels are also gone with faint 
protests. If the current situation will be taken into account, Japan does not pose as a 
regional power, although powerful and to some extent influential in its region, Japan 
is not the actor that decides on the regional dynamics any more.  Its inability to match 
China and convince other countries to act shows the limits of its current power in the 
region. 
When Turkey and Japan’s current situations are looked upon around the 
conditions given by Schrim and Schoeman, both countries were unable to achieve their 
ultimate aims. While both Ankara and Tokyo managed to move towards their bid, 
currently they cannot be seen as regional powers. Turkey and Japan are certainly 
influential regional actors but they have been unable to become effective regional 
powers. 
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